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Contraindicated Drug Courts
Josh Bowers∗
ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, drug treatment courts have gained traction as
popular alternatives to the conventional war on drugs (and to its onedimensional focus on incarceration). Specifically, the courts are meant to
divert addicts from jails and prisons and into coerced treatment. Under the
typical model, a drug offender enters a plea of guilty and is enrolled in a longterm outpatient treatment program that is closely supervised by the drug
court. If the offender completes treatment, his plea is withdrawn and the
underlying charges are dismissed. But, if he fails, he receives an alternative
termination sentence. My premise is that drug courts provide particularly poor
results for the very defendants that they are intended to help most.
Specifically, the most likely participants to graduate are volitional drug users,
who strategically game exit from undesired conventional punishment and
game entry into treatment that they, in fact, do not need. By contrast, the most
likely treatment failures are genuine addicts and members of historically
disadvantaged groups, who thereafter receive harsh termination sentences
that often outstrip conventional plea prices. In short, drug courts are
contraindicated for target populations and may thereby lead to longer
sentences for the very defendants who traditionally have filled prisons under
the conventional war on drugs.
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INTRODUCTION
The widespread proliferation of drug treatment courts ranks among the
bigger criminal-justice surprises of the past two decades.1 In an era of
unprecedented prison growth and ever-increasing sentences for drug
offenders, drug courts have found traction as purported means of diverting
some defendants from incarceration. There are now almost two thousand
such programs operating nationally.2 The courts vary widely in their
specifics,3 but they tend to share some general operating patterns: The courts
closely supervise the participation of non-violent drug offenders in extended
(typically outpatient) treatment regimens.4 Drug court judges adopt an
active—almost inquisitorial—role. And traditional adversaries come together
as part of treatment teams that share the ostensible primary goal of curing
defendant addiction. The courts provide positive reinforcement for good
results and award successful program completion either with dismissals of all
charges or with no-time sentences on pleas to reduced charges.5 Conversely,
the courts deter poor performance with graduated sanctions6 and typically
punish ultimate failure with alternative termination sentences.7
Drug courts have created a few enemies and a great many more

1 Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1481 (2004) (calling drug courts perhaps “the most
significant penal innovation of the past twenty years).
2 NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE, Drug Courts: A National Phenomenon, at
http://www.ndci.org/courtfacts.htm (last visited Jul. 26, 2007).
3 CAROLINE S. COOPER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DRUG COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 4-7 (1995). (describing varying
eligibility requirements); MICHAEL REMPEL, ET AL., THE NEW YORK STATE ADULT DRUG
COURT EVALUATION: POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS AND IMPACTS ix, xiii 265-71 (2003) (noting that
“practice varies widely state to state (and county by county)”); Miller, supra note 1, at 1489
(describing “immense number of local variations on the basic model”).
4 REMPEL, supra note 3, at ix, xiv, 54.
5 Id. at ix; see e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.08(6)(c)(2) (mandating dismissal following
successful program completion); Cal. Penal Code § 1000.3 (same).
6 Graduated sanctions may include more frequent court appearances; more intensive
treatment; demotions to earlier treatment phases; shaming sanctions, like in-court tongue
lashings or public timeouts in the judge’s penalty box (typically, his courtroom jury box); or,
more significantly, short remands to jail. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 1, at 1499; STEVEN
BELENKO, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW, 2001 UPDATE, at 22 (2001);
Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.
Q. 1205, 1232 (1998).
7 By contrast, drug courts that follow the pre-plea model punish treatment failure with
reinstatement of initial charges. However, for present purposes, I focus almost exclusively on
the more “typical[]” post-plea model. Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 1437, 1462 (2000); JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG
COURT MOVEMENT 4 (citing sources).
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supporters from all corners of political and institutional spectra.8 Supporters
maintain that the courts effectively serve several goals: that they provide
second chances for non-violent addicts; preserve systemic resources; and
control crime by disrupting cycles of addiction and recidivism.9 The common
refrain is that “[w]hat we were doing before simply was not working.”10 Thus,
drug courts are said to offer a necessary fresh approach to combating drug
use and drug crime. Conversely, critics principally raise institutional
concerns: that these courts inappropriately convert traditional adversaries
into “team players;” subvert judicial function by turning historically
impartial judges into therapists and interrogators; and even fail to reduce
recidivism and save resources.11
I wish to put to one side the broader debate over the effectiveness and
institutional propriety of drug courts. My aim is to draw attention to two
related, under-appreciated and troubling facets of these courts: first, that
they provide the worst results to their target populations; and, second, that
this inversion of intended effect produces particularly toxic consequences in
drug courts (of which there seem to be many) that subject failing participants
to alternative termination sentences that exceed customary plea prices. Put
concretely, drug courts are contraindicated for genuine addicts and for other
disadvantaged groups that have traditionally filled prisons as part of the war
on drugs, and the consequent adverse effects may be atypically long prison

8 REMPEL, supra note 3, at 5 (describing “almost uniformly positive media coverage and
overwhelming public support at both the national and local levels”).
9 Peggy Fulton Hora., Hon. William G. Schma, John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal
Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 N.D. L. REV. 439, 463
(1999) (noting that drug court “affords those with the disease of addiction a chance to break
that cycle of drug abuse and crime that traps them in a proverbial revolving door); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY
COMPONENTS 6 (1997); John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications
for Justice Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923 (2000); John Feinblatt, et al., Institutionalizing
Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 291 (2000); Claire
McCaskill, Combat Drug Court: An Innovative Approach to Dealing with Drug Abusing First
Time Offenders, 66 UMKC L. REV. 493 (1998); Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 (1998); See, e.g., Miethe, et al., supra note 92, at 527 (noting that
“primary goal” of drug courts is to reduce drug use and recidivism); see generally JUDGING IN
THE A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winnick &
David B. Wexler, eds. 2003).
10 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 106.
11 See NOLAN, supra note 7; Miller, supra note 1; Hoffman, supra note 7; see also Morris B.
Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The
Least Dangerous Branch Becomes the Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063 (2002);
Boldt, supra note 6; Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public
Defender About Drug court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37 (2000); Timothy
Edwards, The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Drug Treatment in the Criminal Justice
System: The Wisconsin Experiment, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 283, 288 (2000).
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sentences for the very defendants that drug courts were supposed to keep out
of prison and off of drugs.12
Worse still, compulsive addicts are not the only ones who do
comparatively badly in drug courts. Studies have shown that other
historically disadvantaged groups—for example minorities, the poor, the
uneducated and the socially disconnected—are also likelier to fail.
Accordingly, drug courts may regressively tax communities already strained
by the incarceration boom, and thereby exacerbate preexisting racial and
socio-economic criminal-justice “tilts.”13
Conversely, drug offenders who are non-compulsive or less-compulsive
ultimately do much better in drug courts. Even if un-addicted offenders do
not want to cease drug use, they possess sufficient self-control to rationally
modify their behavior in response to external carrots and sticks. Faced with
the choice between incarceration and manageable programs, these offenders
have every incentive to strategically game entry into treatment that they do
not, in fact, need in order to receive favorable dispositions that (from a
retributive-justice standpoint) they do not deserve.
At a minimum, such results are incongruous with drug courts’
underlying first-order principles. First, drug courts were intended to break
observed cycles of addiction and incarceration by providing a therapeutic
response to “a problem that is . . . largely medical in nature.”14 Second, and
more subtly, the courts were intended to pushback against (or, at least,
function as a diversionary supplement to) the decades-long one-dimensional
war on drugs that has brought such high rates of imprisonment and
consequent social fragmentation to historically disadvantaged groups, like
young urban African-American males.
The root cause of this contraindication problem is the lack of theoretical
coherence in drug courts. On the one hand, drug courts follow the philosophy
that addiction is a compulsive disease. On the other, the courts expect addicts
See generally http://www.medterms.com (defining “to contraindicate” as: “To make a
treatment or procedure inadvisable because of a particular condition or circumstance.”).
13 See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1875, 1893 (2000)
(discussing traditional criminal-justice enforcement “tilts . . . that target racial or ethnic
minorities who live in urban [areas]”).
14 Hora, supra note 9, at 467, 535 (“Addicted drug users will not respond to incarceration . .
. because these actions do not address the drug user's addiction. . . . [The drug-court model]
provides access to necessary drug treatment to a portion of the population that is in the most
need of treatment, yet is the least likely to receive it.”); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NJC-144531 PROGRAM BRIEF: SPECIAL DRUG
COURTS 1 (1993); NOLAN, supra note 7, at 45 (quoting Jeffrey Tauber, the President of the
National Association of Drug Court Professionals); JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND TREATMENT INNOVATIONS: THE DRUG COURT MOVEMENT—A WORKING
PAPER OF THE FIRST NATIONAL DRUG COURT CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1993, at 8 (1994)
(“[P]rison is a scarce resource, best used for individuals who are genuine threats to public
safety.”).
12
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to be rationally receptive to external coercion. More specifically, the courts
subscribe, at least rhetorically, to the purported belief that addiction is a
“brain disease”—a “chronic, progressive, relapsing disorder.”15 Under this
conception, addiction is unresponsive to traditional criminal punishment,
because jails and prisons lack the tools to help addicts stop, and addicts lack
the volition to stop on their own.16 Moreover, the courts view diversion from
prison and the potential reduction or dismissal of charges as retributively
justified, because addicts possess diminished self-control and therefore
diminished responsibility.17 But drug courts have not—as advertised—
abandoned the “traditional criminal justice paradigm, in which drug abuse is
understood as a willful choice made by an offender capable of choosing
between right and wrong.”18 They have merely relocated the old paradigm to
the background. Accordingly, drug courts see addicts as sick “patients” and
their crimes as symptomatic of illness only as long as they respond to care.
When treatment results run thin, a switch is thrown and drug courts revert
to economic conceptions of motivation and to conventional punishment.
Pursuant to this mixed message, addiction controls addicts’ behavior at the
time of crime (at least to a degree), and addicts therefore deserve less
punishment and more rehabilitation; but addicts control their addictions at
the time of treatment, and they therefore deserve greater punishment if they
fail to exercise control.
Drug courts operate on faith that internal motivation will follow
external motivation—that carrots and sticks will jumpstart inner desire. Put
differently, drug courts meet addicts’ inability to exercise self-control and
reason not only with therapeutic opportunities to address these deficiencies,
but also with concurrent external threats to start responding to reason—or
else. This confidence in addicts’ abilities to discover reason once in drug
courts runs counter to well-established therapeutic principles that treatment
works better when addicts are internally motivated. Indeed, it would be
somewhat surprising if studies showed otherwise. After all, addicts are
people for whom the everyday negative external consequences of drug use—
the social, economic, legal, and physical costs—have proven insufficient to
modify behavior.
Ultimately, when drug courts imprison failing participants, they punish
them not for their underlying crimes, but for their inability to get with the
program. In this way, drug courts bear some resemblance to early medieval
trials by ordeal. These trials—in which the accused performed some onerous
Hora, supra note 9, at 463.
Id. (“In approaching the problem of drug offenders from a therapeutic, medicinal
perspective, substance abuse is seen not so much as a moral failure, but as a condition
requiring therapeutic remedies.”); see generally Alan I. Leshner, 156 Science is
Revolutionizing Our View of Addiction – and What to Do About It, AM. J. OF PSYCH. 1 (1999).
17 Hora, supra note 9, at 535 n.20; infra notes ___.
18 Hora, supra note 9, at 463-64.
15
16
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task as a test of God’s will—measured not culpability, but rather, say,
calluses on hands that enabled the accused to safely carry hot iron. Likewise,
drug courts measure not culpability, but strength of will and social support in
the face of addiction. In both dispositional methods, final sentences are
principally reflective of innate and preexisting advantages. In one sense, in
fact, drug courts may be even more problematic than trials by ordeal: drugcourt results are not just haphazard, they are predictably worst for the most
addicted, the least volitional, and the neediest. As such, the expected failure
of addicts to respond to external stimuli seems an odd basis to subject them
to alternative sentences that outstrip standard pleas.
Moreover, there is little reason to hope that treatment-resistant
offenders might recognize their own fallibility and consequently opt-out of
treatment. The most-compulsive addicts are bound to reach the least-sensible
decisions; the enticements of drug court are dangled before the very
individuals most-easily tempted. When addicts cede to that temptation they
effectively exercise the same cognitive limitations and bounded willpower
that saddled them with drug dependencies in the first instance. They
myopically undervalue the difficulties of recovery and the weight of the
distant but heavy stick that awaits termination. And they optimistically
grasp treatment’s carrots, leaving for tomorrow the question of how to master
their own defective rationalities and wills. Faced with the choice between
conventional pleas, risky trials, or risky treatment, they are prone to see drug
courts as the best means of remaining at or recapturing liberty (even when it
is not). Ultimately, then, external motivation may prove sufficient to convince
addicts to take treatment, but it is less likely to keep them there.
Surprisingly, few scholars have flagged these problems. And most have
raised them in passing only and have provided only anecdotal support for
their intuitions.19 I intend to do more. I intend to construct an analytical
framework for understanding why drug courts fail to adequately screen for
addiction and why genuine addicts, nevertheless, elect to enter the courts—
even though they often should have rationally expected to have done much
better keeping to conventional justice. For support, I rely on data from New
York City’s felony drug courts, and I draw on concepts from behavioral law
and economics and game theory.
Finally, I offer an innovative proposal that re-conceives of drug courts
and how they deliver their benefits. Specifically, I propose uncoupling drug
courts from criminal cases. One way this might be done would be to make
drug courts available to the addicted ex-convict as a resource that he could
opt into at the point in his life-course when he felt ready to do so. Such an
“opt-in” model might still use external motivation. For instance, it could offer
a kind of absolution for the drug-court graduate, expunging the participant’s
See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 7; Miller, supra note 1; Hoffman, supra note 7; Edwards,
supra note 11.
19
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record of drug possession convictions (and perhaps other convictions, as well,
if he could show that they were products of past addiction). Such a court
might, therefore, provide a kind of “libertarian-paternal” nudge in the right
direction for the addicted ex-convict who found himself ready for treatment
but who still required some help getting and keeping clean.20
This article has four parts. In Part I, I analyze New York City’s felony
drug courts. I detail the extent to which these courts rely on atypically high
alternative termination sentences. And I offer some reasons why these courts
(i) came to provide such high termination sentences, and (ii) came to admit
predominantly clean-record drug dealers (who are more likely than recidivist
drug possessors to be strategic gamers). In Part II, I explore the categories of
defendants who fare worst in drug courts, and I explain the several reasons
why these groups enter drug courts irrationally and then fall out of
compliance once there. I also highlight the uncertainties and unique hurdles
that defense attorneys face when called upon to advise clients about whether
they should take the drug-court option. In Part III, I compare New York
City’s drug courts with early-medieval trials by ordeal. I explain that drug
courts are ineffective as screening mechanisms and operate on scientifically
unfounded and incoherent principles. Finally, in Part IV, I offer some
proposals that do away with atypical termination sentences and that also
might provide more effective and just opportunities for genuine addicts to
overcome their dependencies, expunge their drug records, and reintegrate
into productive society.
I. TAKING THE CURE IN NEW YORK CITY
Almost no studies have sought to compare the sentences of failing drugcourt participants with the sentences of conventionally adjudicated
defendants.21 Two limited exceptions are a pair of federally funded studies
recently completed by the Center for Court Innovation in collaboration with
the New York State Unified Court System.22 The chief study analyzed drug
courts in several New York counties, including Queens, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, and the Bronx.23 The other study looked exclusively at the drug
20 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian
Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003).
21 JENNIFER TRONE, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DO DRUG COURTS SAVE JAIL AND PRISON
BEDS? 2 (2000) at http://www.vera.org/publications/publications.asp (noting lack of
research on question of whether drug court failures are punished more severely than
offenders who never entered treatment).
22 REMPEL, supra note 3, at ix, 265-71 (2003); KELLY O’KEEFE & MICHAEL REMPEL, CENTER
FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE STATEN ISLAND TREATMENT COURT EVALUATION: PLANNING
IMPLEMENTATION, AND IMPACTS (2006), both available at www.courtinnovation.org.
23 REMPEL, supra note 3, at ix, 3.
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court in Staten Island.24 Accordingly, the studies collectively examined drug
courts in all New York City counties.
Before discussing the studies’ findings, I offer two brief caveats: First,
although the studies provided data for a collection of state drug courts
outside New York City, I confine my discussion principally to the city’s
courts, because—at least at the time of the studies—these courts handled
felonies almost exclusively, while several of the other courts principally
handled misdemeanors.25 I limit my focus to felony drug courts, because
misdemeanor drug courts present their own unique sets of problems,
advantages, and incentives that are beyond the scope of this article, but that
I hope to explore in a future project. Second, I do not claim that New York
City’s drug-court model is nationally representative; rather, the model
spotlights a path to avoid. (Moreover, the model provides an apt point of
reference, because I was a public defender in Bronx County for three years,
and I practiced often in its drug court.)
A.

The Price of Treatment

The studies found that the sentences for failing participants in New
York City drug courts were typically two-to-five times longer than the
sentences for conventionally adjudicated defendants.26 At the outer margin,
the sentences were well over five times the standard length in Staten Island
and almost four times the standard length in the Bronx.27 Only in Brooklyn
Id.; O’KEEFE & REMPEL, supra note 22.
The Brooklyn and Staten Island drug courts permitted misdemeanants in very limited
circumstances only, typically where charges began as felonies. REMPEL, supra note 3, at 1416; O’KEEFE & REMPEL, supra note 22, at v-vi, 32. Recently, most of the city’s courts have
begun accepting misdemeanors. But these changes post-dated the relevant studies.
26 REMPEL, supra note 3, at 270; O’KEEFE & REMPEL, supra note 22, at 40. The studies
found the same atypically high termination sentences in all-but-one of the counties outside
New York City. REMPEL, supra note 3, at 25. These findings are corroborated by other
observers of New York drug courts. See e.g., TRONE, supra note 21, at 6 (“Researchers at the
Vera Institute studying drug courts in the Bronx, Manhattan, and Queens agree that judges
tend to be harder on offenders who fail than on people who never attempt the program.”).
Likewise, anecdotal evidence indicates that atypically high alternative sentences are
somewhat common nationwide. See, e.g., Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, The
Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court: One-Year Results from a Randomized Study, 39 J.
RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 337, 350, 354 (2002) (finding that alternative sentences for Baltimore
drug court participants were six-to-nine months longer than control-group defendants);
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1493, 1512 (discussing Denver); NOLAN, supra note 7, at 77-78
(noting that “defense-based fears” of atypically high alternative sentences “are often
realized.”); Boldt, supra note 6, at 1212, 1231; COOPER, supra note 3, at 37; see also NOLAN,
supra note 7, at 56 (quoting Judge Stanley Goldstein of Miami drug court: “You could have
gone to trial and got convicted and still done less time than you’re going to do here if you
keep fooling around with me.”).
27 REMPEL, supra note 3, at 270; O’KEEFE & REMPEL, supra note 22, at 40.
24
25
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were termination sentences anywhere close to the length of customary
sentences.28 Significantly, in the Bronx and Staten Island, drug-court
participants did worse on average even when graduates were included.29 In
fact, in the Bronx, the termination sentences approximated the literal worstcase scenario: the typical failing participant was sentenced to two-to-six years
in prison, which was (at the time of the relevant studies) the maximum
sentence on the maximum drug-court eligible charge.30
Tbl.1. Comparative Sentences and Incarceration & Graduation Rates31
Staten Island
Bronx
Queens
Mean Sentence—days
(all drug court participants)

Mean Sentence—days
(drug court failures)

Mean sentence—days
(comparison group)

Incarceration Rate:
(all drug court participant)

Incarceration Rate
(drug court failures)

Incarceration Rate
(comparison group)

Graduation Rate32

Brooklyn

58

209

79

145

208

558

296

304

39

142

129

249

26%

34%

25%

45%

96%

89%

94%

94%

27%

54%

50%

76%

75%

52%

73%

52%

* Source: CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION

REMPEL, supra note 3, at 270.
Id. at 270. Specifically, the comparison defendants in the study were incarcerated for an
average of less than five months. The drug court defendants—combining graduates and
failures—were incarcerated for almost seven months on average. And the drug-court failures
were incarcerated for over eighteen months. Id.
30 REMPEL, supra note 3, at 33, 140, 143; Quinn, supra note 11, at 62-63; RACHEL PORTER,
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES IN THE CRIMINAL COURT: A PROCESS
EVALUATION OF THE BRONX COUNTY DRUG COURT 12 (2001), at
http://www.vera.org/publications/publications.asp. In 2004, Governor Pataki signed the
Drug Law Reform Act meliorating some of the statutory punishments under the draconian
Rockefeller drug laws. DLRA, L. 2004, Ch. 738. Since then, some of the alternative
termination sentences may have changed somewhat. But the available studies predated
these modifications to the law.
31 Data comparing ultimate sentences were not made available for Manhattan. REMPEL,
supra note 3, at 270.
32 These graduation rates are fairly consistent with national rates. BELENKO, supra note 6
(finding average graduation rate of forty-seven percent in national review of thirty-seven
drug-court evaluations).
28
29

WORKING DRAFT – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR CITATION

10

Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008)

Significantly, drug court proponents could spin rosy tales from even
these data.33 Reading quite broadly, they could claim that diversion is
working: in all counties, fewer drug offenders went to prison; and, in most
counties, the collective population of offenders spent less time behind bars.34
But at the individualized level, the positive story does not hold. Take Queens
County, for example: there, drug-court defendants were incarcerated at half
the rate, but those who did go to jail or prison went away for more than twice
as long.35 To say the least, such a result sits uncomfortably with defensible
notions of distributive justice.36 In any event, it cuts against drug-court
advocates’ professed aim of breaking the cycle of addiction and
incarceration.37
B.

A Dealer’s Court

To fully understand the reasons for these atypically long termination
sentences, one must first appreciate a somewhat unique fact about New York
City drug courts: they welcome drug dealers.38 In fact, in the relevant studies,
drug dealers comprised the overwhelming majority of all participants—an
astounding ninety-five percent in the Bronx drug court and ninety percent in
the Brooklyn drug court.39 Indeed, in the Bronx, practically all of the
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the shortcomings of global appraisals).
Accordingly, one study of the Bronx drug court concluded: “[C]ourt planners’ interest in
reducing costs associated with unnecessary detention have not been fully realized.” PORTER,
supra note 30, at 9.
35 See supra tbl.1.
36 Cf. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J.
1909, 2013 (1992) (arguing that “losses, especially, unjust losses, are better spread than
concentrated” and that a contrary premise “stands every known notion of distributional
justice on its head”). On that score, the Bronx findings are particularly troubling, because it
comprises the city’s highest concentrations of minorities and the poor, and it is therefore the
county that has been affected most acutely by the traditional war on drugs and its attendant
incarceration boom. Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Neighborhood, Crime, and
Incarceration in New York City, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 74 (2004) (“[T] he overall
excess of incarceration rates over crime rates seems to be concentrated among non-white
males living in [New York] City’s poorest neighborhoods.”); see also supra note 97, 159 and
accompanying text.
37 See supra notes 9, 14-18, ___; infra note 98 ___; and accompanying text (describing drug
courts as means of diverting recidivist addicts from prison).
38 Several drug courts, nationally, have elected to accept defendants charged with nonpossession drug-related crimes. However, only a minority of drug courts accept dealers. Alex
Stevens, et al., Quasi-Compulsory Treatment of Drug Dependent Offenders: An International
Literature Review, 40 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 269, 272 (2005); Miller, supra note 1, at 539.
39 REMPEL, supra note 3, at 33. In Manhattan and Queens almost three quarters and two
thirds of participants, respectively were dealers. Only in Staten Island were dealers a
minority, making up just over one third of participants. Id.; O’KEEFE & REMPEL, supra note
22, at vi.
33
34
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participants were charged not just with sale, but with B-felony sale—the
highest level felony charge that was eligible for drug court.40
Why did the city’s felony drug courts so readily accept drug dealers, and,
conversely, why did they include so few drug possessors? Over the past two
decades, institutional players of various stripes came to see the onedimensional incapacitation model as unsustainable and inefficient.41 Of
course, deep philosophical differences separated those who saw addiction
principally as a public-health problem and those who saw it as a criminaljustice problem, but even some of the most hardened drug warriors had
grown weary of harsh sentences as the lone drug-war weapon.42 On the
surface of it, the drug-court model seemed to provide a third way—a
politically feasible middle ground that promised a little bit of something for
everyone.43 For the therapeutic community, drug courts would provide much-

40 PORTER, supra note 30, at 18-19 (noting that in first 18 months of operation, 367 out of
396 defendants in Bronx drug court were charged with B-felony sales); REMPEL, supra note 3,
at 143.
41 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1574-75 (“The disease model of addiction and the realities of
the failed war on drugs are driving us to two unpalatable policy choices—either continue to
fill our prisons with drug users or legalize drugs.”); Miller at 1481 (calling drug courts a
“direct response to the ‘severity revolution’” and “an incredibly popular alternative to the
War on Drugs”); STANTON PEELE, ET AL., RESISTING 12-STEP COERCION: HOW TO FIGHT
FORCED PARTICIPATION IN AA, NA, OR 12-STEP TREATMENT 6-7 (2000) (“Since there is a
pervasive sense that we as a society are barking up the wrong tree . . . treatment becomes an
attractive alternative.”); see generally People v. Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d 477, 487 (1994) (noting
that draconian mandatory drug sentences have failed to deter drug trafficking or control
drug abuse); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004); see generally Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism¸47 VILL. L. REV.
753 (2002) (describing shortcomings of drug war); David C. Leven, Our Drug Laws Have
Failed—So Where is the Desperately Needed Meaningful Reform?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293
(2000).
42 See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON DRUGS AND THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE
CYCLE OF ADDICTION & RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 12 (2000), at
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/admin.shtml (quoting then federal drug-czar Barry
McCaffrey: “[T]o break the tragic cycle of drugs and crime . . . [w]e must expand drug
treatment.”); NOLAN, supra note 7, at 54 (quoting drug court judge “‘[E]ven dead rock
conservatives’ recognize that ‘you can’t keep jailing everybody, that it doesn’t do a damn bit
of good for an addict.”); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,
SPEAKING
OUT
AGAINST
DRUG
LEGALIZATION
(2003),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/demand/speakout/index.html (“A successful drug policy must
apply a balanced approach of prevention, enforcement and treatment.”); PEELE, supra note
41, at 5-7 (noting that drug courts are “widely endorsed by the perpetrators of our current
repressive drug policy”).
43 Miller, supra note 1, at 1503; Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Community Courts
and Community Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2003) (“[B]ecause drug courts
emphasized both the individual responsibility of drug addicts and the disease model of
addiction, they enabled persons with widely divergent views about drug policy to find
common ground.”); T. Cameron Wild, et al., Attitudes Toward Compulsory Substance Abuse
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needed alternatives to incarceration—alternatives that would emphasize
treatment over culpability.44 For drug warriors, drug courts would promote
expeditious case processing, would require rigorous treatment, would ensure
traditional incapacitation for failing participants, and might also deflate calls
for more radical legislative change.45
Drug courts, then, are experimentalist institutions born of incremental
compromise. They developed from the ground up in ad-hoc and undertheorized fashions.46 But the give-and-take that characterizes such
institutional compromises has the tendency to produce unintended results—
for instance, the overabundance of drug dealers in New York City’s felony
drug courts.47 Specifically, the city’s drug courts were at least partially
intended as a response to (or an end-run around) the unpopular and
draconian Rockefeller drug laws.48 As indicated by a New York State

Treatment: A Comparison of the Public, Counselors, Probationers and Judges’ Views, 2
DRUGS: EDUCATION, PREVENTION AND POLICY 33 (2001) (discussing how drug courts are
designed to satisfy both those “who believe that . . . the criminal justice system is the most
appropriate societal response . . . [for] substance abuse [that] represents willful misconduct . .
. [, and] those who believe that substance abuse represents involuntary pathology”).
44 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 140 (“[T]he notion of guilt is made increasingly less relevant. . . .
Guilt . . . is philosophically non-germane . . . to such a process.”); William D. McColl,
Baltimore City’s Drug court: Theory and Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467,
500 (1996) (noting that drug court approach is “primarily medical rather than legal”); Levy,
supra note 71, at 135; see also Nolan at 49-50 (noting how drug courts ‘shift the paradigm in
order to treat drug abuse as a biopsychosocial disease.”); Hora, supra note 9, at 462-65
(offering drug court to alternative of expanding prison population and ineffective probation
programs); Miller, supra note 1, at 1553 (noting “the centrality of diversion from prison
among the liberal justifications for establishing and supporting drug courts”).
45 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 51-56 (noting that “to be therapeutic is not to be soft on crime”);
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1527 (noting that treatment and punishment are not “mutually
exclusive weapons in the war against drugs”); Dorf & Fagan, supra note 43 (describing drug
courts as “both a reaction to and part of the war on drugs”); see also infra note 232 and
accompanying text.
46 Hora, supra note 9, at 110, 122, 137 (“[F]ew early DTC [drug court] practitioners worried
about the jurisprudential theory behind the DTC movement. DTCs seemed to work, and the
absence of analysis or debate coming from the ‘ivory towers’ of academia . . . did not much
matter.”); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Courts and Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 841 (2000) (describing drug courts as products of local
innovation).
47 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1574-75 (“[T]he drug court as a public policy solution to the
drug dilemma is . . . a conflicted, and some would say cynical, appeasement of two powerful
political forces—the law enforcement community and the treatment community.”).
48 Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 806 (2004)
(“The Rockefeller drug laws in New York included harsh mandatory minimums that shocked
even prosecutors and the police.”); see also Rockefeller Drug Laws, N.Y. Laws 276-78, 676,
1051 (1973); Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 9, 10 (1999) (calling Rockefeller drug laws “most severe in the nation at the time” of
passage, and noting that “[w]ithin just a few years of their adoption, the Rockefeller laws
were found wanting both because of their distortions of the court system and their excessive
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Commission (made up of prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and
academics) that endorsed statewide drug-court expansion: “The courts, of
course, do not write the state’s drug or sentencing laws. . . . The issue is thus
whether there is anything—consistent with their adjudicatory role—that our
state courts can do.”49
Historically, for felony possession cases, drug courts were not needed to
circumvent unwelcome application of the Rockefeller drug laws. Instead,
prosecutors would commonly reduce felony possession charges to
misdemeanor charges.50 Conversely, prosecutors had no readily available
statutory option to reduce sale charges.51 In any event, prosecutors were
unwilling to do so: they might have disliked aspects of the Rockefeller drug
laws, but they still believed that drug sales were best handled as felonies, not
misdemeanors. As such, drug courts offered a way to “draw a distinction,”
where the law as written had failed to do so, “between the addicted . . . lowlevel drug seller, on the one hand, and a drug trafficker, on the other.”52 Drug
dealers would have the chance to avoid prison and even a criminal record,
but—as the quid-pro-quo cost of their treatment—they would have to agree to
plead guilty prior to entering treatment, and they would have to accept the
inevitability of atypically high alternative sentences when they failed out.
Consequently, drug courts came to welcome so many drug dealers because
punitiveness”). Notably, a study of the laws found that the rate of felony drug arrests that
resulted in drug indictments fell by almost a third in the three years after the laws’ passage
and the rate of dismissals more than tripled. Malcolm M. Feeley & Sam Kamin, The Effect of
“Three Strikes and You're Out” on the Courts: Looking Back to See the Future, in THREE
STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: VENGEANCE AS PUBLIC POLICY (David Shichor & Dale K. Sechrest,
eds. 1996). This effort to bypass the Rockefeller drug laws is just one more example of a wellestablished trend whereby legislators pass mandatory sentencing schemes and judges,
prosecutors, and police try to recapture preexisting sentencing norms. See MICHAEL TONRY,
SENTENCING MATTERS 135, 147 (1996) (“[M]andatory penalty laws . . . meet with widespread
circumvention . . . and too often result in imposition of penalties that everyone involved
believes to be unduly harsh. . . . Sentencing policy can only be as mandatory as police,
prosecutors, and judges choose to make it.”); Feeley & Kamin, supra, at 140-45.
49 COMMISSION, supra note 42, at 10; see also, COMMISSION, supra note 42 (Stanley S.
Arkin, concurring and dissenting from commission’s report; and faulting the commission for
not doing more to take on the Rockefeller drug laws directly); see generally Hoffman, supra
note 10, at 2097 (arguing that drug court is “a judicial reaction to laws some judges do not
like”—an effort to repeal laws “by therapeutic judicial fiat”).
50 See, e.g., N.Y.P.L. § 220.03. Citywide only forty-six percent of defendants arrested on
felony possession charges were indicted between 1990 and 2006, in Manhattan the fraction
hovered around one quarter. See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES,
STATISTICS (on file with author); see also Telephone Conversation with Michael Rempel,
Research Director, Center for Court Innovation (Jun. 25, 2007). For my part, I represented
scores of clients initially charged with felony drug possession and not one was ultimately
indicted for possession alone.
51 The lowest level narcotics sale charge is a D-felony. N.Y.P.L. § 220.31. By contrast, sale
of marijuana is typically a misdemeanor. N.Y.P.L. § 221.35-40.
52 COMMISSION, supra note 42, at 7.
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the preexisting sentencing options were undesirable; and the courts came to
handle so few felony drug possessors, because this defendant population
already comprised such a small pool.53
C.

A Dealer’s Game

Of course, a drug dealer may be an addict, too. And there will always be
some indeterminacy between those who sell to feed habits and those who sell
to fill wallets.54 But there is something just a bit unsettling about a drug
court where drug possessors comprise only one-in-twenty participants. In any
event, prosecutors and court personnel in New York City did almost nothing
to ensure that treatment offers went to the addicted.
In the first instance, prosecutors were given unilateral decision-making
authority over which defendants were permitted to enter drug courts.55 And
prosecutors were typically reluctant to offer treatment to recidivist
defendants but were enthusiastic to offer it (sight unseen) to clean-record
defendants—a population composed of comparatively fewer genuine addicts.56
Specifically, before making offers, New York City prosecutors would review
cases for “paper eligibility”—a non-clinical paper-based assessment that
would turn entirely on the defendant’s current charges and past record—not
on his therapeutic need or lack thereof.57
53 The effort to bypass the Rockefeller drug laws is just one more example of a wellestablished trend whereby legislators pass mandatory sentencing schemes and judges,
prosecutors, and police try to recapture preexisting sentencing norms. See MICHAEL TONRY,
SENTENCING MATTERS 135 147 (1996) (“[M]andatory penalty laws . . . meet with widespread
circumvention . . . and too often result in imposition of penalties that everyone involved
believes to be unduly harsh. . . . Sentencing policy can only be as mandatory as police,
prosecutors, and judges choose to make it.”); Feeley & Kamin, supra note 48, 40-45.
54 Cf. Brownberger, at 68-60 (noting various incentives to sell drugs).
55 Miller, supra note 1, at 1540 (“The prosecutor exercises sole power to recommend that a
defendant be diverted to drug court, subject to statutory constraints. If the prosecutor
decides that the criteria do not apply, the defendant has no further recourse.”); Quinn, supra
note 11, at 57 (“Like other diversionary programs, most drug treatment courts operate at the
whim of the prosecution. In New York, drug courts cannot make promises to defendants
without the approval of the Office of the District Attorney.”).
56 Hoffman supra note 7, at 1509 (noting that addicts are more likely to be recidivists and
therefore excluding recidivists felons makes no sense).
57 Quinn, supra note 11, at 60 (“[I]n the Bronx, drug court eligibility is initially determined
on the basis of the charges in the case and the defendant’s criminal record, not a defendant’s
drug use or abuse history.”); PORTER, supra note 30, at 6, 9 (“explaining that supervising
prosecutors paper screen all drug-related cases and assess eligibility “based on criminal
history and current charge,” and noting that “[t]hese charge-related eligibility criteria are
not entirely aligned with the broadest therapeutic goals of drug courts”); Miller, supra note 1,
at 1541. For instance, in the Bronx, defendants are ineligible if the charged crime happened
within one thousand feet of a school—a circumstance that, in a dense city like New York,
may have far more to do with happenstance than culpability or treatment need. PORTER,
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Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the city’s drug-court
participants had no prior convictions.58 For example, in the Queens drug
court, only one-in-five participants in the relevant studies had a prior
conviction and only one-in-ten had a prior drug conviction.59 And the
recidivists that did manage to receive offers typically had light records: a
mean of two or fewer prior misdemeanor convictions in all city counties.60
Finally, among the recidivists, few had spent much of any time in jail or
prison before the current arrest.61 For example, in the Bronx, Queens, and
Manhattan the mean prior incarceration time was twenty-nine days, sixteen
days, and seven days, respectively.62 Comparatively, in Rochester, Syracuse,
and Buffalo, where the drug courts handled principally misdemeanor nonsale cases, approximately two-thirds of participants had criminal records; the
participants averaged three-to-four prior convictions; and the mean periods of
prior incarceration were six-to-eight months.63 In these upstate counties,
prosecutors were more willing to extend drug-court offers to long-time
recidivists (and thus more likely addicts), because the stakes were lower:
treatment was an alternative to misdemeanor—and not felony—charges.
Thus, notwithstanding the supposed first-order drug-court aim of
stopping the cycle of addiction and incarceration among recidivist addicted
drug users, the profile of the typical New York City defendant who received a
drug-court offer was something else entirely—a clean-record dealer.64 And
after prosecutors made their non-clinical paper-based offers to these
defendants, drug-court personnel would do little substantive further vetting.
While candidates were required to submit to clinical assessments, only a
small fraction of candidates were rejected for insufficient addiction or use.65
supra note 30, at 9.
58 REMPEL, supra note 3, at 33, tbl.3.2.
59 Id.
60 Id. Indeed, in Queens County, the mean was 0.59 prior convictions. Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. In Brooklyn, the mean was approximately three months, but this figure seems
skewed by the admission of some predicate felons, many of whom were previously
imprisoned. Id. (indicating that seventeen percent of Brooklyn participants had prior felony
convictions).
63 In these courts less than two percent of defendants were charged with drug sales
(compared with the ninety plus percent in some New York City courts. Id; supra notes 39-40
and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 9, 14-18, ___; infra note 98 ___; and accompanying text.
65 Hoffman supra note 7, at 1462 n.106 (describing these clinical evaluations as “lenient”
and “limited”); Miller, supra note 1, at 1541-42; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, TREATMENT DRUG COURTS: INTEGRATING SUBSTANCE ABUSE WITH LEGAL
CASE PROCESSING 17 (1996) (“Personnel doing the screening do not have to be social services
professionals. . . . The screening can be done quickly (no longer than 20 minutes).”); PORTER,
supra note 30, at 16-17 (showing that during the first year of Bronx drug court less than five
percent were rejected both for insufficient and too heavy addictions); O’KEEFE & REMPEL, at
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There were two principal reasons for this. First, drug courts have every
incentive to take all (or, at least, most) comers, because drug courts are
funding-dependent entities, and the money streams hinge on meeting
capacity and treatment targets.66 For example, the Staten Island drug court
intended to enroll two hundred participants in its first year, but enrolled only
thirty-two.67 In such circumstances, a court would be unlikely to reject a
borderline- or un-addicted defendant, especially since lack of drug
dependency correlates with treatment success.68
Second, drug courts share with the general public the misperception that
all drug use constitutes abuse.69 Accordingly, any paper-eligible defendant is
typically permitted entry so long as they are willing to self-report some level
(any level) of drug use—whether true or not.70 Addiction, however, is in fact a
vague and variable phenomenon.71 Typically, drug users (even addicts) are

12 (indicating that only nine percent were rejected in Staten Island for non-addiction or
addiction denial); see also Quinn, supra note 11, at 60 (“[F]ew of the defendants routed to the
Bronx Treatment Court are rejected because they do not need help with drug or alcohol
abuse. . . . The biggest fear of rejection exists . . . for those who . . . seem to need too much
help.”). Personally, I represented about twenty clients in the Bronx Treatment Court and
never had one rejected for non-addiction.
66 Miller, supra note 1, at 1542 (“There are . . . incentives for treatment programs to take
non-addicts. The program completion rate of the non-addict is likely to be higher than the
addict. The non-addict is less prone to relapse, and recidivism is likely to be reduced.”);
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1466 (“The literature widely supports the proposition that drug
statistics have been inflated by a self-sustaining, public-private partnership interested in
keeping use statistics high to justify enormous public expenditures.”); Edwards, supra note
11, at 287-88. As Jeffrey Tauber, President of the National Association of Drug Court
Professionals, warned prospective drug court judges, “Programs that can’t show immediate
and direct results lose out at budget time.” NOLAN, supra note 7, at 59, 65, 97 (describing
funding and development efforts as kind of theater).
67 O’KEEFE & REMPEL, supra note 22, at 11; see also PORTER, supra note 30, at 13 (noting
that Bronx drug court planned to enroll six hundred in first eighteen months of operation but
enrolled only 453).
68 See infra notes ___. In the extreme, they may even “cherry pick[] the low-risk candidates
. . . [over] the high-risk candidates they were designed originally to served.” Miller, supra
note 1, at 1553. Unsurprisingly, then, a Department of Justice study found that a majority of
the surveyed courts targeted even those with “minimum substance dependency.” COOPER,
supra note 3, at 4-5.
69 PEELE, supra note 41, at 6 (noting misguided perception that all drug use signifies
addiction); see also id. at 9 (describing conventional “disbelief” in the notion of non-addictive
drug use).
70 Finally, drug court personnel tend to concur with prosecutorial treatment offers to
defendants with light or no records out of (i) fealty to prosecutorial decision making and (ii)
the desire, discussed earlier, to craft alternatives to undesirable mandatory drug laws. See
supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
71 Levy, Self-Deception and Responsibility for Addiction, 20 J. APP. PHIL. 133, 135 (2003)
(“‘[A]ddiction’ is a colloquial term without an agreed-upon use, either in philosophy, or in
medicine.”); Stephen J. Morse, Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility, 19 L. & PHIL.
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neither slaves to their poisons, nor are they rational economic actors able to
cease drug use the moment long-range interests in abstinence come to
outweigh short-term cravings for highs.72 Addiction strikes different users
differently—if at all.73 It describes a seamless continuum: individual users
act under diverse degrees of compulsion.74 Among even the heaviest of users
of even the heaviest of drugs, some individuals are more compulsive, some
less.75 On each tail of the curve lay the remote few who either have complete
or no ability to stop.76
Over time, the probability of developing some type of dependency rises.
But even long-time users of highly addictive drugs, like heroin, may (by grace
of good brain chemistry) find themselves to be “chippers”: casual users who
can put aside habits with little or no effort at all.77 What drug courts fail to
adequately consider is that, even though some heavy users may find cravings
irresistible, other users resist with relative ease.78 Accordingly, the chipper
8, 12 (2000) (“[T]here is no consensus definition and any definition chosen will be
problematic”).
72 For example of these polar views compare Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory
of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675 (1988); with Alan I. Leshner, Addiction is a
Brain Disease and It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45, 46 (1997); Charles P. O’Brien & A. Thomas
McLellan, Myths About the Treatment of Addiction, 347 LANCET 237 (1996) (“At some point
after continued repetition of voluntary drug taking, the drug ‘user’ loses the voluntary ability
to control its use. At that point, the ‘drug misuser’ becomes ‘drug addicted’ and there is a
compulsive, often overwhelming involuntary aspect to continuing drug use and to relapse
after a period of abstinence.”).
73 Morse, supra note 71, at 15 (“Perhaps, however, compulsive drug seeking and using is
not the indicator of a unitary disease.”).
74 Morse, supra note 71, at 45 (“[R]ationality and hard choice are continuum concepts.
There are infinite degrees. Consequently, responsibility must be a matter of infinite
variation.”); STANTON PEELE, THE MEANING OF ADDICTION 103 (1985) (“Addiction can be
understood only as a multifactorial phenomenon: It takes place along a continuum, in
degrees.”).
75 Morse, supra note 71, at 20 (“Some users develop the craving soon after initial use;
others do so later. For some, the craving is so strong that seeking and using the substance
becomes a central life activity and even central to the agent’s identity.”); Gene M. Heyman, Is
Addiction a Chronic, Relapsing Disease, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY: THE
STRUGGLE TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE 99, 102 (Philip P. Heymann & William N. Brownsberger
eds., 2001) (arguing that if addiction qualifies as disease, it is not one that strikes uniformly).
76 Heyman, supra note 75, at 99, 107 (“Recovery from addiction is probably always a
struggle, and for a significant minority it is a protracted battle.”); PEELE, supra note 74, at
25-26, 97, 113, 128-29; Morse, supra note 71, at 19.
77 Morse, supra note 71, at 19 (discussing heroin chippers and defining chippers as those
who “use potentially addicting substances regularly, but do not develop an addiction”);
Heyman, supra note 75, at 86; see also PEELE, supra note 74, at 58-59 (discussing cigarette
chippers); MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2002) (same).
78 PEELE, supra note 41, at 7 (noting “a range of patterns of narcotic use, among which the
classic addictive pattern was only one variant that appeared in a minority of cases”); Morse,
supra note 71, at 12.
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has ample opportunity to exploit drug courts. Faced with a choice between
prison and treatment, he takes the drug-court option as “the lesser of two
evils.”79 He strategically games exit from conventional justice that he does
not want, so he can enter into treatment that he does not need.80 For him,
treatment may be laborious, time-consuming, and irritating; but it is
probably manageable, because he is abler to rationally modify his lesscompulsive behavior in order to meet court demands.81 He is an actor on the
drug-court stage: he dutifully plays the role of acute addict and does at least
enough to “go[] along with the program.”82

79 Adela Beckerman & Leonard Fontana, Issues of Race and Gender in Court-Ordered
Substance Abuse Treatment, DRUG COURTS IN OPERATION: CURRENT RESEARCH 57 (James J.
Hennessy & Nathaniel J. Pallone, eds. 2001); BELENKO, supra note 6, at ___ (citing study
finding that 96% of drug-court participants reported drug court to be “easier” than prison);
Miller, supra note 1, at 1541, 1569 (“[T]here are good reasons for non-addicts to wish to enter
the program.”). It is a common observation that incarceration is a “break point” for
defendants. JONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE 47
(1978); see also Thomas W. Church, Examining Local Legal Culture, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
449, 489 (1985) (quoting defendant: “Hell, I’d plead guilty to raping my grandmother if the
sentence was probation.”); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective
Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 82 (1995) 85-86 (noting that
defendants “will agree to almost anything to get out of jail”); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure
and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, HASTINGS L. REV. 957, 987 n.84 (1989) (“When the
prosecutor offers a sentence that results in immediate release, such as probation or a
sentence to time served while awaiting trial, the availability of immediate freedom adds
something to the differential which again cannot be captured simply by a number.”).
80 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 87 (noting that participants are non-addicts “more often than
many movement advocates would care to admit”). Indeed, in New York City, where the
propensity for gaming is greatest, the data revealed significantly higher graduation rates
than in Syracuse, Rochester, and Buffalo, where participants are recidivist misdemeanant
drug possessors and, hence, likelier compulsive addicts. REMPEL, supra note 3, at 41-42;
O’KEEFE & REMPEL, supra note 22, at 24. Remarkably, the graduation rate in Queens was
over three times the rate in Rochester. REMPEL, supra note 3, at 41-42.
81 Heyman, supra note 75, at 86 (noting that chippers are “able to regulate their intake so
that their drug use does not interfere with other aspects of their life”); Hoffman, supra note
11, at 2069 n.25 (“Defendants understand that they have to play the treatment game to pass
through the criminal hoops.”); supra note 77 and accompanying text. For example, one study
described a “long-term seller, with four felony convictions, [who] was a relatively light user.
He used the treatment offer as an opportunity to avoid an almost certain long prison term. . .
. He says continuing to stay clean is not a problem because he was never addicted.” NOLAN,
supra note 7, at 221 n.41. Indeed, one treatment provider conceded that as many as half of
the drug court clients in his program were for-profit un-addicted dealers. Id. at 87.
82 Adela Beckerman & Leonard Fontana, Issues of Race and Gender in Court-Ordered
Substance Abuse Treatment, DRUG COURTS IN OPERATION: CURRENT RESEARCH 47 (James J.
Hennessy & Nathaniel J. Pallone, eds. 2001). Notably, observers have compared the entire
drug-court experience to a kind of theater. See NOLAN, supra note 7, at 61-89 (“Drug court is
theater . . . and the actors in it play new and redefined roles. In the backstage, practitioners
conspire about how best to make the courtroom theater communicate a particular message to
clients and others in the courtroom audience.”).
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II.

POOR PROSPECTS, POOR CHOICES

Compared to the volitional thrill-seeking chippers and for-profit drug
dealers who strategically game into unneeded treatment, acutely addicted
defendants and defendants from historically disadvantaged groups are far
less likely to succeed in drug courts. Specifically, studies have shown
consistently higher termination rates for recidivists83 and hard-drug
users84—two characteristics reflective of genuine dependency. Likewise,
younger participants do worse than older participants—a difference
attributed to the “aging out” phenomenon, whereby the grip of addiction
slackens overtime; and, as it does, the user grows more responsive to
treatment.85 Additionally, studies have shown that graduation rates correlate
with wealth,86 education,87 employment,88 strength of social networks,89 and
REMPEL, supra note 3, at xii (“[P]rior criminal convictions were near universally
predictive of future recidivism.”); Michael Rempel & Christine Depies Destafano, Predictors
of Engagement in Court-Mandated Treatment: Findings at the Brooklyn Drug court, 19962000, DRUG COURTS IN OPERATION: CURRENT RESEARCH 93 (James J. Hennessy & Nathaniel
J. Pallone eds. 2001) (citing sources); Young & Belenko; Elaine M. Wolf, et al., Predicting
Retention of Drug Court Participants Using Event History Analysis, 37 J. OFFENDER
REHABILITATION 139-62 (2003); Miethe, et al., supra note 92, at 532-33.
84 Specifically, users of crack and heroin do consistently worse in drug courts. See, e.g.,
Rempel & Destafano, supra note 83, at 91-92 (citing sources that indicate that the more
addictive the participant’s primary drug of choice (e.g., heroin, cocaine, crack) the more
difficult it is to break the addiction”); REMPEL, supra note 3, at xii, 41 (indicating statistically
significant effect of heroin and crack habits on chances of completing New York drug courts);
Scott R. Senjo & Leslie A. Leip, Testing and Developing Theory in Drug Court: A Four-Part
Logit Model to Predict Program Completion, 12 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 66-87 (2001); Thomas
F. Babor, et al., Unitary versus Multidimensional Models of Alcoholism and Treatment
Outcome: An Empirical Study, 49 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 167-77 (1988).
85 See Heyman, supra note 75, at 85, 107 (citing studies); PEELE, supra note 41, at 6
(“Maturing out . . . will occur far more often than not.”); Cooper, supra note 3; John R.
Hepburn & Angela N. Harvey, The Effect of the Threat of Lagal Sanction on Program
Retention and Completion: Is That Why They Stay in Drug Court?, 53 Crime & Delinquency
255, 268-70 (2007); Douglas Young & Steven Belenko, Program Retention and Perceived
Coercion in Three Models of Mandatory Drug Treatment, 32 J. DRUG ISSUES 297-328 (2002);
REMPEL, supra note 3, at 41-43 (finding that younger defendants did better than older
defendants in all but one county); PEELE, supra note 74, at 97; see infra note 219.
86 Rempel & Destafano, supra note 83, at 91 (citing studies); REMPEL, supra note 3, at 43
(same); Levy, supra note 71, at 138.
87 Rempel & Destafano, supra note 83, at 91 (citing studies); REMPEL, supra note 3, at 43
(same); Mara Schiff & W. Clinton Terry, Predicting Graduation from Broward County’s
Dedicated Drug Treatment Part, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 291 (1997); Hepburn & Harvey, supra note
85, at 270.
88 Rempel & Destafano at 91 (citing studies); REMPEL, supra note 3, at 43 (same).
89 Hepburn & Harvey, supra note 85, at 271 (“[T]he consistent predictors of retention and
completion were social bonds to the community as measured by being married, having a high
school education, and being employed.”); Rempel & Destafano, supra note 83 (noting that
participants from communities with weak social networks and widespread poverty do worse
83
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lack of mental illness.90 To some extent, these categories may overlap with
addiction. Accordingly, it is unclear whether the characteristics, themselves,
indicate profound addiction; or whether the characteristics pose endogenous
obstacles to effective treatment; or whether, more likely, some combination is
at play. In any event, the consequences are regressive and clearly undercut
drug court’s therapeutic and distributive aim of improving circumstances for
those most in need of help.91
Finally, the impact of race qua race is ambiguous. Several studies have
found race to be a significant variable, but some have not.92 But the latter
studies came to that conclusion only by controlling for economic, social, and
demographic variables.93 Historically, minority communities are overexposed
to the kind of socio-economic hurdles—like poverty, social fragmentation, and
unemployment—that contribute to addiction and thwart treatment.94 And
the war on drugs has only compounded these historical stumbling blocks.95
Accordingly, to control for economic, social, and demographic factors in urban
minority communities is to ignore the everyday realities of life in these

in drug courts); see generally Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV.
669 (1998) (discussing relationship between social isolation and crime); Tracey L. Meares, It’s
a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U.L. REV. 579, 588-89 (1997) (same); Tracey L Meares,
Neal Katyal, Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171,
1188-89 (2004) (same).
90 Rempel and Destafano, supra note 83, at 93 (citing studies showing reduced retention
rates among dually diagnosed). Again, it is notable that those who commit crimes under
arguably greater external compulsion (and therefore lesser volition) are the very individuals
punished most under the drug-court model.
91 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
92 See Rempel & Destafano, supra note 83, at 91-92 (citing conflicting studies); see also
REMPEL, supra note 3, at ___ (finding no significant effect); Senjo & Leip, supra note 94, at
66-87 (finding higher retention and completion rates among whites than nonwhites); Dale K.
Sechrest & David Shicor, Determinants of Graduation from a Day Treatment Drug Court in
California: A Preliminary Study¸ 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 128-48 (2001) (same); Schiff & Terry,
supra note 87, at 291-310 (1997) (same); Beckerman & Fontana, supra note 82, at 48 (same);
Terrance D. Miethe, Hong Lu & Erin Reese, Reintegrative Shaming and Recidivism Risks in
Drug Court: Explanations for Some Unexpected Findings, 46 Crime & Delinquency 522, 53233 (2000) (same); BELENKO, supra note 6, at 27 (same).
93 Rempel & Destafano, supra note 83, at 91-92; REMPEL, supra note 3, at ___ (finding no
effect after controlling for socio-economic factors).
94 Beckerman & Fontana, supra note 82, at 48 (“Addiction professionals have come to
realize that powerful cultural and social factors have an impact on addictive behaviors, and
the effectiveness of treatments offered to remedy those behaviors.”).
95 See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 695 & nn.73-74 (“[Social] costs [of the drug war] . . . include the
perceived dearth of men ‘eligible’ for marriage, the large percentage of black children who
live in female-headed households, the lack of male ‘role models’ for black children . . . , the
absence of wealth in the black community, and the large unemployment rate among black
men.”); see also supra note ___ and accompanying text.
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communities.96 The fact that skin color, by itself, may be insignificant might
say something positive about the state of race-based animus in twenty-firstcentury America, but it is a distinction without a difference when it comes to
the de facto shortcomings of drug courts as efficient diversion from prison for
those who faced highest incarceration rates under the conventional war on
drugs.97
Nor is it sufficient to claim that failing participants have brought
disaster upon themselves and should therefore be held accountable for their
poor choices. As an initial matter, the notion that addicts should see fit to opt
out of drug courts (that purportedly were designed expressly for them) runs
counter to the principal first-order goal of compelling addicts to treatment.98
That aside, the objection is hollow, because many drug courts—particularly
felony drug courts, such as those in New York City—are constructed to
provoke these poor decisions. The courts offer up enticing (but often elusive)
carrots to the very defendants who are most ill-equipped to make and comply
with rational choices.
A.

Irrational Addiction

To the extent that the amorphous concept of addiction can be effectively
categorized, it is perhaps best understood as a defect or weakness of reason
and/or will.99 First, the addict may lack the power to think rationally. His
ability to reason is distorted by prolonged drug use, such that he is unable to
adequately process even readily available information. Such an addict is selfdeceptive (or an irrational thinker); he shapes his perceptions in self-serving

Beckerman & Fontana, supra note 82, at 50 (“African-American male substance abusers
often face multiple chronic problems that ‘feed’ their substance abuse. The presence of
unemployment, hopelessness, unstable living conditions, inadequate or non existent financial
resources and health problems are common factors that aggravate and diffuse efforts to
arrest addictive behaviors among these client groups.”)
97 See, e.g., Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, The Sentencing Project, Uneven Justice: State
Rates of Incarceration by Race and Ethnicity (2007), at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/Publications.aspx, (finding that nationally African
Americans are incarcerated at six times the rate of whites, and Latinos are incarcerated at
double the rate of whites); BELENKO, supra note 6, at 27 (citing studies that whites had twoto-three times higher graduation rates than nonwhites in some drug courts); supra note 93
(citing sources); see also Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1825 (“[I]n a society where racial division is
all too real, decisions that have no racial cause may still have a very powerful racial
meaning.” (emphasis in original)).
98 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1509 (“The original concept . . . was to reach the hardcore
addict who, more often than not, has been through the revolving doors of prison on many
other drug or drug-driven convictions.”); see also supra notes 9, 14-18, ___; infra notes ___;
and accompanying text.
99 R. Jay Wallace, Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections, 18 LAW
& PHIL. 621, 622, 655 (1999).
96
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ways and typically exhibits denial about use and its consequences.100 Second,
the addict may lack the strength to act on convictions. Such an addict is
akratic (or an irrational actor); he is unable to exercise sufficient willpower to
follow rational courses, even when he knows what those courses are.101
The basis for the addict’s irrationality and bounded will is not what
transpires while he is on drugs, but rather, what happens to him once he is
off of them. He suffers strong dysphoric physical and psychological sensations
of withdrawal that are typified by heightened tension, anxiety, depression,
nausea, and sweating.102 Left unmet, his cravings become a kind of “sheer
wanting” that overawes his senses—an ache akin to dehydration or
starvation.103 In the extreme, then, his desires may prove as irresistible as
efforts to “not scratch[] an itch, [or] void[] one’s bladder.”104
Admittedly, the addict is not alone in his penchant to cede to inadvisable
temptation. All people are prone to cognitive limitations and imperfect
motivation—even in the presence of perfect information.105 Put simply,

Ainslie, supra note 85, at 80 (“Addicts often fail to notice basic facts about their
addictions, such as how much they ingest or that ingestion under some circumstances counts
as part of their addiction. . . . In the extreme, they may develop whole dissociated
personalities like Jekyll and Hyde.”); supra note 71, at 133-36 (arguing that addicts deceive
themselves by treating evidence for and against use “in a motivationally biased manner”);
Heyman, supra note 75, at 108; see also Morse, supra note 71, at 39 (“[I]t’s very difficult to
concentrate the mind on the good reasons not to use. . . . The agent may not recognize the
various options at all or may not be able coherently to weight and assess those that are
recognized.”); see generally Morse, supra note 71, at 39 (noting that fundamental components
of rationality include “the capacities to think clearly and self-consciously and to evaluate
one’s conduct”).
101 See Michael Louis Corrado, Addiction and Responsibility: An Introduction, 18 Law &
Phil. 579, 583-585, 587 (“[T]he addict might know perfectly well what he ought to do, so that
no defect of reason is involved; nevertheless his behavior is not under his control, however
that might be construed.”); see also Wallace, supra note 99, at 632, 652 (noting that addiction
may be akratic condition because addicts “fail to comply with their deliberated verdicts in the
face of temptation.”); Ainslie, supra note 85, at 80 (noting that willpower often “backfires” for
addicts); Ole-Jørgen Skog, The Strength of Weak Will, 9 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 245-271 (1997);
see generally Donald Davidson, How is Weakness of the Will Possible? in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS
AND EVENTS 21-42 (Donald Davidson, ed. 1980) (exploring akrasia).
102 Morse, supra note 71, at 39.
103 Id. One addict described the craving as like “a buzzing in my ears that prevents me from
focusing.” Id. (emphasis added).
104 Id.
105 See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 39 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2003); Ainslie,
supra note 85, at 90-92 (arguing that hyperbolic curves pose “innate challenge” to all
humans); Ainslie, Speech, at 3 (describing hyperbolic discounting as “natural” and noting
that “experiments on both human and animal subjects . . . have unequivocally found a
discount curve for delayed rewards different from the one assumed by conventional utility
theory”). In this way, the addict operates under the same flaws of reasoning and willpower
that lead study subjects, exposed to noxious noise, to choose short periods of immediate
silence over longer periods of delayed silence. Ainslie, supra note 85, at 89.
100

WORKING DRAFT – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR CITATION

23

Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008)

addicts are just “outsized” versions of us all.106 Their cravings are factors that
exacerbate endemic human limitations.107 But the degree of difference
between the addict and the garden-variety myopic thinker may be dramatic
and debilitating: “[M]yopic . . . mechanisms are usually adequate, producing
near optimal outcomes under normal conditions. However, addictive drugs
have unusual properties that sabotage optimal outcomes. . . . This
combination of properties implies a net loss for decision processes that are
biased in favor of the immediate rather than the delayed value of the
commodity.”108
This does not mean that the addict’s condition is hopeless (though there
may be extreme instances where it is). But his condition is unpredictable and
precarious. To speak of the consequences of addiction, then, is to speak of
probabilities, not absolutes.109 The addict has a “predisposition” and
“vulnerability” that may lead him, on the one hand, to overweight his ability
to cease use, and, on the other hand, to continue to follow a destructive course
of conduct—no matter how many good reasons he may have for
forbearance.110 Put concretely, addicts are prone to optimism bias, risk
seeking, and hyperbolic discounting.
i. Optimism
On the “ambiguous” question of whether addicts can master their
addictions, they “see what they want to see,” and they disregard the rest.111
See Ainslie, supra note 85, at 111 (“The best conclusion is that addiction is just an
outsized case of a vulnerability that everyone has, and that it may have become outsized
either from genetic endowment or a history of bad choices, or both.” (emphasis in original));
supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
107 Ainslie, supra note 85, at 85, 90-92; Heyman, supra note 75, at 108 ([C]hoice is not
guided by rational bookkeeping principles, as often assumed in economic theory, but by
myopic, psychological principles that reflect partial and distorted information about the
competing alternatives.”).
108 Heyman, supra note 75, at 108; see also Ainslie, supra note 85, at 111; infra note 106.
109 Richard J. Bonnie, Responsibility for Addiction, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 405,
407 (2002).
110 Wallace, supra note 99, at 635 (arguing that whether reason and will can overcome
addictive cravings may or may not be wholly “up to the agent to determine”); see also Bonnie
at 407; Morse, supra note 71, at 14-15; Michael Louis Corrado, Behavioral Economics,
Neurophysiology, Addiction and the Law, UNC LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 32 (2006), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=892007 (“To say that an agent chose a
particular course of action is not to say that he had a choice in the matter; his choice may
have been dictated by things beyond his control. And to say that he chose a particular course
of action, then, cannot exclude the possibility that it would have been extremely difficult to
avoid that course of action.”).
111 Daniel C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS 151 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2003) (“When there is enough ambiguity to permit it,
106
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They are “steeped in denial,” harboring self-serving perceptions about
strength of habit and capacity to cease use.112 Even when they have perfect
information about risk, they believe magically that they can “beat the odds”
and “control chance events.”113 Put simply, they harbor “‘positive illusions,’ . .
. of personal control.”114
Moreover, studies have shown that people tend to exhibit the greatest
levels of overconfidence over inadvisable risks in matters that fall within
their specific areas of knowledge, and in which they play active parts.115 So,
for example, people prefer to bet on their own future dice rolls over guesses at
the past rolls of others.116 And, if nothing else, addicts know about drug use
and necessarily play active roles in defeating it. Unlike trial, which is the
domain of lawyers, addiction belongs to addicts—it is theirs. Thus, because
they (and not their lawyers) are called upon to act, they are especially prone
to make over-optimistic assessments of their capacities to act. And drug
courts aggravate this problem still further by projecting overly sunny images
people naturally ‘see what they want to see.’ And what they want to see is something that is
in their self-interest.”); cf. SIMON & GARFUNKEL, The Boxer, on BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED
WATER (1970) (“Still, a man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest.”).
112 Edwards, supra note 10, at 288 (noting that addicts are “incapable of assessing or
evaluating the competing pressures that are brought to bear when coercion is applied”); see
also supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
113 Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 323
(1975); Cass at 4 (“Even factually informed people tend to think that risks are less likely to
materialize for themselves than for others. Thus, there is systematic overconfidence in risk
judgments.”); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 39 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.
2003) (“People tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them than to
others.”); Langevoort, supra note 111, at 149 & n.17 (“One of the most robust findings in the
literature of individual decision making is that of the systematic tendency of many people to
overrate their own abilities, contributions, and talents. This egocentric bias readily takes the
form of excessive optimism and overconfidence, coupled with an inflated sense of ability to
control events and risks.”).
114 See generally Jolls et al., supra note 113, at 15-17 (discussing people’s tendency to
“overestimate their ability to control outcomes that are determined by factors outside of their
control”); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Delusions of Success: How Optimism
Undermines Executives’ Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV. 56-63 (July 2003); Richard Birke & Craig
Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1 (1999)
(surveying literature on optimism bias).
115 Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competance in
Choice Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 22 (1991) (“[P]eople are paying a
premium of nearly 20% for betting on high-knowledge items. . . . As a consequence, people
prefer the high-knowledge bet over the matched lottery, and they prefer the matched lottery
over the low-knowledge bet.”).
116 Heath & Tversky, supra note 115, at 8, 22 (citing study); cf. JONATHAN D. CASPER,
CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE 51 (1978) (“One of the peculiar differences
between trial and plea defendants is the greater propensity of those who have had trials to
complain that they have not had the chance to present their side of the case. . . . [P]leas may
foster a greater sense of participation.”).
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of seemingly inevitable therapeutic success: the interactive and personable
judge, the kinder and gentler prosecutor, the rhetoric of disease and cure—all
lead prospective participants to believe they can get clean (even when cooler
heads might conclude that they probably cannot).117
ii.

Risk Seeking

For detained addicts, the problems of irrational decision making are that
much worse. Generally speaking, people are not risk seeking; they are risk
averse, because losses loom larger than gains.118 However, when people are
presented with the choice of a guaranteed loss against a medium or mediumto-high probability of a greater loss, they seek risk in the hope of avoiding all
loss.119 Put differently, in the “domain of losses,” a fair chance of recapturing
the pre-existing status quo is the preferred option, notwithstanding the
potential for substantial downside.120 For example, people prefer the fiftyfifty risk of losing two thousand dollars (or getting back to even) to the
certainty of losing one thousand dollars.121
Detained drug offenders exist wholly in the “domain of losses.”122

117 See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1489; see also Langevoort, supra note 111, at 150
(explaining how “groups can increase optimistic biases” by cultivating atmosphere of
optimistic thinking).
118 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992) [hereinafter, Advances];
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference Dependent
Model, 106 Q. J. OF ECON. 1039 (1991) [hereinafter, Loss Aversion]; Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263
(1979) [hereinafter, Prospect Theory].
119 See Kahneman & Tversky, Advances, supra note 118, at 298 (“[R]isk seeking is
prevalent when people must choose between a sure loss and a substantial probability of a
larger loss.”); id. at 316 (“Underweighting of high probabilities contributes . . . to the
prevalence of risk seeking in choices between probable and sure losses.”); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 4538
(1981) (describing pseudocertainty effect wherein people exhibit risk aversion if the expected
outcome is positive and risk seeking if the expected outcome is negative); see also Birke &
Fox, supra note 114, at 44 n.178 (“Although people are typically risk-averse for moderate to
large probability gains and risk-seeking for moderate to large probability losses, this pattern
is reversed for low probability gains and losses.”); Emma B. Raisel, et al., Can Prospect
Theory Explain Risk-Seeking Behavior by Terminally Ill Patients?, 25 MED. DECIS. MAKING
612 (2005) (“[O]ne of the key predictions of prospect theory—that people are risk seeking in
the domain of losses.”).
120 Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 118, at 285; see also Kahneman &
Tversky, Loss Aversion, supra note 118, at 1042 (noting preference for retention of the status
quo over other options).
121 Birke & Fox, supra note 114, at 43-44.
122 Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 244
(1999) (noting that the defendants may enter “domain of loss” at the time of arrest).
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Conventional modes of justice provide no opportunities for present freedom;
some loss is certain (albeit potentially less than the loss attendant to
treatment failure). Any conventional plea is likely to require some amount of
jail or prison;123 and any trial is likely to require months of waiting behind
bars.124 In comparison, drug courts provide a “short[] route to liberty,”
typically in the form of immediate release into outpatient treatment
programs.125 Detained addicts incautiously seek drug-court risks, because
treatment is the only game in town—the only available gamble against
otherwise certain loss.126 In such circumstances, detained drug-court
candidates come to resemble terminally ill patients, who are willing to try
most anything—including experimental, potentially debilitating, and wholly
unpredictable treatment—in order to avoid otherwise certain grim fates.127
Probation sentences for first-time felony drug offenders are sometimes statutorily
permissible, even under the Rockefeller drug laws. Quinn, supra note 11, at 62-63 &
nn.145,152. There appears to be some debate over whether such offers are common or the
exception. Compare PORTER, supra note 30, at 18-19 with Quinn, supra note 11, at 62-63
nn.145,152. However, in my experience, even when such offers were permissible, detained
defendants were the least likely beneficiaries. At best, prosecutors might offer “split
sentences” of several months in jail combined with five years probation.
124 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008)
(discussing average waits of several months for misdemeanor trials and more than one year
for felony trials).
125 Quinn, supra note 11, at 56 n.116 (“[M]any defendants entering treatment are simply
accepting the shortest route to liberty. . . . Under these conditions is it fair to say that the
defendant . . . in the throes of addiction . . . is freely making a decision among options?”); see
also REMPEL, supra note 3, at xiv (“When clinically feasible, most courts prefer to begin
participants in outpatient treatment and then upgrade to inpatient in response to relapses or
other compliance problems.”). In almost all New York Courts studied over half of participants
began in outpatient. Id. at xiv; see also Miller, supra note 1, at 1496 (citing similar national
figures). In Bronx the figure is 87%. REMPEL, supra note 3, at 54. Moreover, it appears that
drug court dispositions often can be had more quickly even than conventional pleas. Id. at xi
(“Drug court cases reach initial disposition more quickly than conventional court cases.
Participants in all six drug courts spent significantly less time from arrest to initial
disposition/program entry than comparison defendants.”). Specifically, the mean time from
arrest to disposition was about one month or less in the three New York City courts where
such a time period was measured, and the median ranged from three-to-eighteen days. Id. at
268. Conversely, the mean time for the comparison groups was five-to-six months and the
median time was approximately three months. Id.
126 Further, there is an additional argument that those who engage in criminal behavior—
especially those who (at least at first use) volitionally ingest harmful drugs—tend to be risk
seeking by nature. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1967-68 (1992) (arguing that criminals
are by nature risk seeking); see also Birke, supra note 122, at 246 & n.132 (“[W]e can see that
criminals appear to be more risk seeking than the general population in both the decision to
engage in prohibited behavior and in the decision to exacerbate penalties by hiding or
running from detection.”); see also Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerrety, Some
Experimental Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary
Penalties and Risk, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 138 (1995).
127 See Emma B. Raisel, et al., Can Prospect Theory Explain Risk-Seeking Behavior by
Terminally Ill Patients?, 25 MED. DECIS. MAKING 609 (2005).
123
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iii. Hyperbolic Discounting
Several addiction theorists have linked addictive behavior to hyperbolic
discounting.128 The addict’s preferences have the tendency to reverse as the
short-term rewards of use become more immediate. In the moment of
temptation, he can appreciate nothing but present desire.129 Cravings
overpower capacity to listen to or follow contrary reasons that would or
should hold sway over conduct—if only the addict could keep his head clear
and his will responsive.130 This accounts, then, for the addict’s commonly
observed loss of control, impulsive behavior, and ambivalence toward use.131
In the throes of withdrawal, the addict feeds his demons. But submission to
these demons is not rational just because they are close at hand; the demons
may simply have crowded out other thoughts and potential courses of action
and thereby kept the addict from adequately comprehending—much less
comporting behavior to—the greater demons that await continued use. In the
face of such consuming desire, it is somewhat beside the point whether
addiction distorts thinking and/or weakens the will—or even whether
addiction qualifies as a psychosocial and/or physiological disease.132 It is
enough to recognize addiction’s deleterious effects: that the addict may act

See, e.g., Corrado, supra note 110, at 27 (discussing argument that addicts may discount
hyperbolically because of “distorted reasoning . . . [,] a flaw in . . . approaching future costs
and benefits . . . that . . . lands the addict . . . in hot water”); Ainslie, supra note 85, at 91;
Bikel & March; PEELE, supra note 74, at 98-99 (noting that drug users are hyperbolic
discounters, because they overvalue the immediate comfort of use); Levy, supra note 71, at
138; see generally Jolls et al., supra note 113, at 46.
129 Warren K. Bickel & Lisa A. March, Toward a Behavioral Economic Understanding of
Drug Dependence: Delay Discounting Processes, 96 ADDICTION 73, 81 (2001); see generally
Ainslie Speech, at 2 (“[O]rganisms will often form temporary preferences for smaller-sooner []
rewards over larger-later [] ones when the [smaller-sooner] rewards are imminent, and thus
are innately impulsive.” (emphasis added)).
130 Ainslie, supra note 85, at 84 (noting that addiction “can impose motives on a person that
she otherwise doesn’t want, and those conditioned motives can overwhelm his normal,
‘rational’ ones”).
131 Bickel & March, supra note 129, at 75; Ainslie, supra note 85, at 79 (noting that
hyperbolic discounting is product of addicts’ “ambivalence”—that they “ingest[] their
substance while saying they don’t want to”). Ainslie highlighted one of the chief conundrums
for those who advance rational theories of addiction: “Addicts often refuse treatment, or, even
more perplexingly, accept it and then work to defeat it.” Id. at 79.
132 Morse, supra note 71, at 39-40 (“For moral and legal purposes, the precise mechanisms
by which addiction can compromise rationality are less important, however, than the clear
evidence that it can.”); see also Heyman, supra note 75, at 99, 102 (“Again, the issue is not
whether addiction has a biological basis or whether drugs change the brain. Rather, the issue
is whether the biology of addiction results in a state such that drug consumption is no longer
significantly influenced by consequences.”); Ainslie, supra note 85, at 85 (arguing that
whether addiction is disease is secondary to understanding addiction’s impact on
motivation).
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foolishly on short-term urges that defeat the long-term rewards of selfcontrol.
This is not, then, simply a matter of prioritizing the present over the
future—a rational decision to alleviate immediate pain. Standing alone, there
is nothing irrational about steep but exponential discounting over time.
Instead, hyperbolic discounting involves an inconstant discount rate—it is
the product of the inability to think and act rationally in the face of pain.133
And just as the addict “fails to develop a faculty for ‘utility constancy’” when
deciding whether to take drugs, he suffers the same limitation when deciding
whether to take coerced drug treatment. The addicted defendant’s aversion to
immediate loss (that is, continued incarceration) and his undue preference for
immediate reward (that is, any type of near-term freedom) compels him to
seize the benefits at hand and discount the significant potential termination
sentence and long-term difficulties of overcoming addiction.134
We can look to the Bronx data by way of example. There, conventional
sentences were a bit less than five months and termination sentences were a
bit more than eighteen months.135 Nevertheless, almost all eligible
defendants elected to take the drug-court option.136 No doubt, a sizable
number of them would have chosen differently if the offers were structured in
a fashion that held back all rewards: if the choice were between, say, (i) two
years and five months in prison, or (ii) two years in prison plus an intensive
one-to-two year outpatient treatment program with the failure threat of an
additional eighteen months in prison and the graduation promise of
dismissal.137
B.

Uncertain Treatment

Once in treatment, addicts are less likely to respond rationally to
information about the consequences of noncompliance and continued use.
Notably, the much-celebrated tolerance of drug courts for relapse may
backfire.138 Specifically, addicts may conclude erroneously that, because the
court met past slip-ups with slaps on the wrist, it will abide future relapse, as

Ainslie, supra note 85, at 91; see generally Jolls et al., supra note 113, at 46.
Jolls et al., supra note 113, at 46 (“[Hyperbolic discounting] means that impatience is
very strong for near rewards (and aversion very strong for near punishments), but that each
of these declines over time.’”); Ainslie, supra note 85, at 101 (“[I]n the middle of a choice
between a small, early and larger, later reward, the urge to see your way clear to take the
early one is great, which leads people to gamble on . . . shaky grounds.”).
135 See supra tbl. 1.
136 See infra notes 189, __ and accompanying text.
137 Quinn, supra note 11, at 59 (“It is difficult to imagine that many incarcerated clients in
the Bronx, even those with potentially ‘winnable’ cases, would opt to exercise the right to go
forward to trial when the ‘freedom’ of treatment is knocking at their door.”).
138 See infra notes 202, ___ and accompanying text.
133
134
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well.139 Moreover, even if addicts were capable of informed rational choice,
that information is often withheld: “The number of positive urine analyses . .
. or other treatment failures that will be tolerated before a defendant is
sentenced to prison is not typically written in stone and instead is left to the
discretion of the particular drug court judge who happens to be presiding at
the time.”140 Indeed, Jeffrey Tauber, the President of the National
Association of Drug Court Professionals, has advised judges to promote just
such a culture of uncertainty: “Uncertainty of outcome after a remand, and
its accompanying anxieties, can be a useful motivator for both the offender
and the audience.”141 But, while ambiguity may serve to motivate some, it is
likely to lead others down the primrose path. When a judge remands a
participant, with the admonishment that “the gig is up,” only to subsequently
release the participant to his program after two days confinement, the
wayward participant may come to believe that the judge does not mean what
she says and that no number of instances of noncompliance will result in
ultimate termination.142
Additionally, uncertainty exists ex ante over the structure and length of
drug-court programs. First, prospective participants may not know what to
expect from judges who have unfettered judicial discretion over supervision,
participant progression, and the allocation of in-program rewards and
sanctions.143 Second, prospective participants may not be made aware of the
particular treatment provider that will administer care. Often participants
are directed to particular providers—not on the basis of therapeutic need—

139 Ainslie, supra note 85, at 99 (“Acting in my long range interest, how do I keep a short
range interest from repeatedly proposing an exception to my rule, ‘just this once?’”); Levy
supra note 71, at 134 (noting addicts’ susceptibility to confirmation bias and availability bias,
which lead addicts to conclude that they can safely take “[j]ust one [more] hit”); cf. Jolls at
292 (explaining that people underestimate their own probability of apprehension for driving
drunk); see generally Jolls et al., supra note 113, at 45-46 (noting that criminals, subject to
availability bias, assess probabilities of sanctions according to consequences of past
misdeeds). Indeed, this may be why addicts sometimes do best by quitting cold turkey.
Ainslie, supra note 85, at 99, 104-08 (“[O]ne of the traits of recovering addicts . . . [is]
excessive legalism.”).
140 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1463; REMPEL, supra note 3, at xiv (“[D]rug court teams
frequently make individualized decisions based on what they believe will be most effective
with a particular participant rather than adhering to a rigid schedule of graduated
sanctions.”); NOLAN, supra note 7, at 105 (“The judge’s aim is to develop a flexible,
individuated, responsive interaction with each offender, . . . in which ‘there are no hard and
fast rules” governing how the judge does so.”).
141 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 70; see also TRONE, supra note 21, at 12 (“[M]any treatment
counselors exaggerate the legal consequences of failure.”).
142 TRONE, supra note 21, at 11 (“[R]esearch . . . indicate[s] that knowing the consequences
of failure and the rewards for succeeding has a positive effect on treatment retention and
outcomes. Moreover, certainty may be more important than severity.”).
143 See infra notes __ and accompanying text.

WORKING DRAFT – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR CITATION

30

Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008)

but on bases of space constraints and other practical demands.144
Finally, the overall duration of drug-court programs are somewhat
indeterminate. Drug courts anticipate certain minimum lengths, but
defendants typically must satisfy consecutive periods of “clean time,” during
which they must not test positive for drugs.145 Likewise, they may be
demoted for noncompliance to earlier treatment phases.146 Consequently,
treatment often lasts some unknowable period longer than the scheduled
term.147
In the face of such uncertainty, addicts may find it all the more difficult
to make informed choices about whether to take the drug-court option, and to
know, understand, and comply with the parameters of treatment going
forward.
C.

Exogenous Influences

And there are related, exogenous, institutional and societal reasons why
addicts, minorities, and the poor do comparatively worse in drug courts—
reasons that transcend cognitive limitations, bounded will, and imperfect
information. Specifically, because coerced treatment overlays conventional
justice, institutional and enforcement decisions may have profound impact on
what ultimately happens in drug courts.148 First, with respect to bail, the
determination of whether to set bail and in what amounts turns principally
on prior record and community ties (holding crime-charge constant).149 Acute
144 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1513 (“[T]he very presence of a fixed array of dispositional
and treatment regimens begins to drive a one—or maybe three—size(s)-fit(s)-all
philosophy.”); Boldt, supra note 6, at 1224, 1227 (“The central problem . . . is practical:
society cannot afford to offer each offender a unique treatment plan. . . . [I]ndividuals . . . will
be referred to whatever program within the network of affiliated providers happens to have
an opening.”).
145 REMPEL, supra note 3, at 20-21, 23.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 59-60 (noting that successful treatment in New York City typically took five-to-ten
months longer than minimum); PORTER, supra note 30, at 33.
148 Miller, supra note 1, at 1568 (“The differential impact of the criminal justice system on
poor individuals may be exacerbated for minorities, who are much more likely to receive
incarcerative sentences than non-minorities. Such factors may lead poor and minority
defendants to accept diversion into drug court where others would not.”).
149 See NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, FACTORS INFLUENCING RELEASE AND
BAIL DECISIONS IN NEW YORK CITY, PART 2. BROOKLYN 25-28, 50 (2004), available at
www.nycja.org/research/research.htm (discussing importance of criminal history in bail
decisions and concluding that for some judges criminal record is “the strongest factor” in
deciding whether to set bail); see also NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, FACTORS
INFLUENCING RELEASE AND BAIL DECISIONS IN NEW YORK CITY, PART 1. MANHATTAN 29-43, 48
(2004), available at www.nycja.org/research/research.htm. For example, one national study
found that courts set bail or remanded over three quarters of all recidivist felony defendants.
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addicts, minorities, and the poor are more likely to be recidivists and are less
likely to have strong social networks.150 And, once bail is set, these groups are
less likely to have access to the means to satisfy it.151 Hence, they are more
likely to make the choice to take or decline drug court from jail.
Second, with respect to arrest, police more frequently come to re-arrest
recidivist addicts, minorities, and the poor. And drug courts use these
instances of re-arrest as bases for treatment termination.152 Specifically,
recidivists are common first targets of enforcement activities, because they
are known personally to the police, they habituate high-crime areas, and/or
they are simply more likely to look the criminal part.153 Likewise, poor and/or
minority communities are disproportionate foci of police enforcement.154
Significantly, such efforts might not be racist or classist in construction.155
Enforcement may be selective, simply because drug crime is everywhere, but
the police cannot be.156 Police rationally concentrate on poor and urban—
often minority—communities, because drug use is more readily discoverable
there.157 Specifically, in these neighborhoods, drug crime—like other aspects
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2002, at 20 & tbl. 18 (2006), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract. Overall, courts held recidivist defendants until
disposition about fifty percent more frequently than defendants with no criminal records. Id.
150 See supra notes 83-97, __ and accompanying text.
151 For example, in New York City in 2004, only nine percent of defendants held on bail
were able to buy release at arraignment. CJA, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note ___, at 22.
Remarkably, the figure rose only to sixteen percent even for defendants held only on minimal
bail of $500 or less. Id. And only an additional twenty-seven percent were released at some
later date. Id. at 24. Likewise, national studies show that most recidivist defendants are
unable to pay bail, and, as a group, they are substantially less likely to pay bail than
defendants without criminal records. See, e.g., DOJ, FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note ___, at
20 & tbl.18.
152 COOPER, supra note 3, at 30-31 (noting that many drug courts use re-arrest as basis
for—sometimes mandatory—termination); REMPEL, supra note 3, at 142.
153 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008)
(discussing usual-suspects policing).
154 William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998); Stuntz,
supra note 13; Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 986-87 (1999).
155 Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1261-70 (1994); see also Stuntz, Drugs, at 1833.
156 See Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1875 (“Police and prosecutors have to decide where to
invest their time and energy.”); Stuntz, supra note 154, at 1819 (“[N]ot only must the police
look for the crimes, they must decide where to look, in a world where the crimes are
happening everywhere. . . . [W]hom they catch depends on where they look.” (emphasis in
original)).
157 Stuntz, Drugs, supra note 154, at 1810, 1820-22 (“Looking in poor neighborhoods tends
to be both successful and cheap. . . . Street stops can go forward with little or no advance
investigation. . . . [T]he stops themselves consume little time, so the police have no strong
incentive to ration them carefully.”).
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of life—occurs more frequently out of doors.158 And the tactics that police use
against such highly visible crime (street stops and sweeps) are cheaper and
easier to undertake than the tactics used in more affluent neighborhoods
(wiretaps, informant tips, and house searches). Regardless of animus, the
effect is the same: for systemically disfavored groups, the police—and not just
drug courts and treatment programs—are watching.
In short, contexts matter. Because drug courts are embedded within a
society where inequalities exist and onto a justice system that traditionally
arrests and punishes minorities and the poor more frequently and harshly
than others,159 coerced treatment that uses conventional justice as a backstop
leads to ultimate sentences that are informed by the same social, economic,
and institutional pressure points that historically have led to disparate
punishment under the conventional (incarceration-focused) war on drugs.
Consequently, addicts, minorities, and the underprivileged are terminated
more frequently from drug courts, even perhaps in circumstances where they
are doing just as well (or badly) as their white and affluent counterparts.
D.

Counsel’s Dilemma

But what of defense counsel? Where are the lawyers to warn against illadvised coerced treatment before candidates reach fateful choices? Much has
been made of the defense lawyer’s problematic drug-court role as “team
player.”160 And the criticism is fair. But the chief problem with teamwork is
not the defense lawyer’s abandonment of her adversarial role per se. It is the
fact that drug courts relegate the defense lawyer to a marginalized position
where she can, at most, make rough (often counterintuitive) predictions on
unanswerable questions that fall outside her expertise and training.161
First, the defense lawyer is not a diagnostician who is trained to make
158 See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1190 (1996)
(“[R]esidents of poor urban neighborhoods tend to make especially heavy use of streets and
sidewalks for social interactions.”); see also Stuntz, Drugs, supra note ___, at 1824 (“[P]eople
with money enjoy more privacy than people without.”).
159 Jeffrey Fagan, Race, Legitimacy, and Criminal Law, 4 SOULS 69, 70 (2002) (“Under the
recent policies of the New York City Police Department, aggressive stops and searches have
been disproportionately aimed at nonwhite citizens, far outpacing their actual involvement
in crime.”); see also supra note 97; see generally Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining¸ 91
MARQ.
L.
REV.
__
(forthcoming
2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=996431.
160 See Boldt, supra note 6; Quinn, supra note 11.
161 See supra note ___ and accompanying text. As one defense lawyer chillingly put it: “The
defense lawyer doesn’t fit well in this system in his traditional role. . . . [G]et the lawyers out
of the process. Defendants tend to use their lawyers to protect them. And in the therapeutic
environment, which is kinder and gentler, that is probably not a productive thing.” NOLAN,
supra note 7, at 86.
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predictions on the prospects of therapeutic effectiveness. And the courtroom
is not the setting to make these clinical assessments, in any event. Instead,
the defense lawyer is trained to forecast the chances of trial victory.
Moreover, even the most highly trained drug counselor or therapist cannot
know ex ante with any degree of certainty whether a particular drug-court
modality employed at this particular time in this particular addict’s life is
bound to achieve results. Ultimately, it is addict’s drug habit—not the
lawyer’s legal knowledge, training, or reason—that will dictate failure or
success. Yet, with freedom in the balance, the defense lawyer is expected to
advise her client with little insight into the most important determinate of
all: the client’s own subjective state of mind and strength of will. Defense
lawyers are made to act as “envoys to [the] sovereign country” of their clients’
psyches.162 On such foreign ground, the lawyer can make, at best, educated
guesses: more often than not, that the less compulsive the client seems to be,
the more advisable it is for him to strategically game treatment (that he, in
fact, does not need).
Second, the grand compromises that underpin drug courts left the
defense lawyer out of the power-sharing equation. She has been shuttled to
the background in a process that has largely been stripped of the procedural
formalism that was her stock in trade.163 Indeed, the defense lawyer is
sometimes not even expected at (or alerted to) appearances.164 Accordingly,
the very types of defendants least equipped to reach sound rational decisions
are called upon to make—and take responsibility for—largely unguided
choices. Instead, judges encourage participants to engage the court
personally. The judge talks and jokes with them about their families and
prospects—their slip-ups and accomplishments. But the judge also has the
power to punish them, and when she does so she is unconstrained by
Ainslie, supra note 85, at 112.
NOLAN, supra note 7, at 77-79 (“In the context of the drug court, then, the defense
attorney very decidedly jettisons some traditional responsibilities in deference to the defining
assumptions of a therapeutic perspective.”); Boldt, supra note 6, at 1245 (“[D]efense counsel
is no longer primarily responsible for giving voice to the distinct perspective of the
defendant’s experience in what remains a coercive setting.”); see also supra notes 143-147, __
and accompanying text. Perhaps, the defense bar has given into this diminished role,
because—living in the “long shadow” of the war on drugs—any politically viable alternative
to incarceration is preferable to the status quo. Miller, supra note 1, at 1482-84 (“Many
advocates of the due process model are simply opposed to the new goals of imprisonment and
welcome any form of diversion, especially for victimless drug crimes.”).
164 DOJ, KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that defense attorneys should
advise drug court candidates “that he or she will be expected to speak directly to the judge,
not through an attorney”); Quinn, supra note 11, at 64 (describing “culture of informality . . .
whereby most players in the court view the presence of a defense attorney at status hearings
as nonessential”); NOLAN, supra note 7, at 85 (“[T]he client directly engages the judge, and is
asked to be open and honest with the judge about all sorts of issues . . . not only . . . about his
or his drug use but about employment, family, friendships, and financial concerns.”); see also
infra notes 163, 161, __ and accompanying text.
162
163
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customary procedural rules.165 Thus, the judge can met out sanctions—
sometimes of individual invention—without hearings and based on
potentially flimsy inadmissible evidence.166 When judges are free to construct
rewards and sanctions out of whole cloth and to keep participants in
treatment for indeterminate lengths,167 the defense lawyer can do little more
to provide effective and informed advice than to simply throw up her hands
and tell her client, “Prepare to turn your life over to this judge and her whims
for at least the next year or two.”168
As a final note, numerous scholars have flagged self dealing as a
significant plea-bargaining concern.169 Elsewhere, I have posited that the
See Boldt, supra note 6, at 1252 (describing a “judge-driven . . . process . . . coupled with
a high degree of informality”); Miller, supra note 1, at 1514-15; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra
note 46, at 852 (arguing that drug courts are not truly courts because the judge “adjudicates
no disputed issues”) Indeed, this informality is one of the aspects of the courts that judges
like so much. NOLAN, supra note 7, at 94 (describing how judges appreciate freedom from
traditional adjudicative functions that they find “too confining, boring, unrewarding,
insufficiently responsive to social problems”); see also NOLAN, supra note 7, at 105 (quoting
Judge Hora: “The more you take away judicial discretion, the more you might as well judge
have a computer sitting up there on the bench. You know, just punch in the numbers and tell
me how long the sentence is. And it gives you nothing that you went to the trouble of
becoming a judge for.”).
166 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; cf. Hoffman, Danger at 2088 (“Judges don’t
provide helpful advice to voluntary participants on their long-road to recovery, they issue
court orders that are backed by the power of the carceral state most drug-courts advocates
wished to sidestep.”) For example, one judge jailed a participant based on a letter from his
mother that indicated that he had started using drugs again. NOLAN, supra note 7, at 94.
Another judge informed a participant’s employer: “If he doesn’t come to work on time, if he
comes to work under the influence of any kind of drugs, I’ll put him in jail, on your say so.”
Id.
167 See supra notes 145-147, __ and accompanying text.
168 Quinn, supra note 11, at 55 (“For a client who pleads guilty in treatment court, the
defense attorney may not be able to provide the same definitive answers she would for the
client accepting a plea offer in a traditional courtroom.” (citing People v. Parker, 711
N.Y.S.2d 656, 661 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining that vague sentencing terms that render
conditions of compliance open to “subjective interpretation” may violate due process)). The
same might be said of probation, but at least defendants typically plead down to lesser
charges, so the fear of atypical probation violation sentences is diminished. In any event,
probationers are entitled to revocation hearings, at which they can appeal probation
decisions to independent judges. Drug court failures have no such recourse; the judge
monitors the program, declares it finished, and hands down sentence. NOLAN, supra note 7,
at 102 (“One wonders, given this more intimate relationship between the judge and the
defendant, whether a level of judicial impartiality can be sustained.”); see also Hoffman,
supra note 7, at 1514: (“[W]hen all the ebbs and flows of treatment are tallied up and labeled
as an overall failure . . . all of the failures . . . are sent to prison with virtually no further
judicial inquiry.”).
169 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2477 (2004); David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties,
19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 115, 123 (1994); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in
Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. J. 1179, 1182-1194, 1201-03 (1975).; John B. Mitchell, The
165
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agency concern may be overblown—at least in the context of low-stakes
cases.170 Drug courts, however, are a different matter. The indolent lawyer
who wishes to dispose of the substantive case can readily convince the overoptimistic acutely addicted poor candidate to take drug court, because the
offer seems to hold out the promise of everything the defendant could want:
immediate freedom and the possibility of dismissal. The lawyer can then
monitor compliance with little effort (and often from afar); and, if and when
termination comes, the lawyer is required to appear only for a sentencing
hearing at which no contested issues are litigated and for which no work need
be done.171
III.

NEW YORK CITY DRUG COURTS AS TRIALS BY ORDEAL

Years ago, John Langbein wrote a clever, entertaining, and somewhatdisturbing essay comparing the medieval practice of torture and the modern
practice of plea bargaining.172 The more fitting analogy to drug-court practice
may be the early- and pre-medieval practice of trials by ordeal. In trials by
ordeal, clergy would administer physical tests—which included the ability to
carry hot iron, walk over glowing ploughshares, or remove stones from boiling
water—to discern divine judgment on the guilt or innocence of the accused.173
Clergy deemed the accused innocent if he completed the ordeal unharmed (or,
at least, with only wounds that healed quickly and cleanly).174
Both trials by ordeal and drug courts are inaccurate checks for
blameworthiness. At most, trials by ordeal test for thickness of skin.175 And
drug courts test for strength of will, clarity of reason, and social and economic
privilege.176 Moreover, for both dispositional forms, the very individuals
Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney—New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN L. REV.
293, 319 (1980); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 Law & Soc’y Rev. 15, 18 (1967) (describing
defense attorney as a “double agent”).
170 Bowers, supra note 153.
171 Cf. Quinn, supra note 11, at ___ (“[I]f a first-time felony drug offender were advised by
his attorney to accept a plea offer involving a sentence of two to six years, most attorneys
would agree that such advice was incompetent”).
172 John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978).
173 Ian C. Pilarczyk, Between a Rock and a Hot Place: The Role of Subjectivity and
Rationality in the Medieval Ordeal by Hot Iron, 25 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 87, 87-92 (1996);
Rebecca V. Colman, Reason and Unreason in Early Medieval Law, 4 J. Interdiscipl. Hist.
571, 582 (1974).
174 Pilarczyk, supra note 173, at 87-92; Colman, supra note 173, at 582. Other ordeals
included the ordeal by combat, the ordeal by swimming, and the ordeal by morsel (where the
accused had to swallow a quantity of food without choking). Colman, supra note 173, at 582.
175 Cf. Langbein, supra note 172, at 7 (noting that torture problematically “tests the
capacity of the accused to endure pain rather than his veracity”).
176 Franklin Zimring, Drug Treatment as a Criminal Sanction, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 809, 815
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burdened least by the process itself also suffer the smallest (if any) back-end
sanction. With respect to trials by ordeal, hot coals hurt, but they hurt rough
hides less. With respect to drug courts, the act of getting and staying clean is
agonizing for the genuine addict, but merely annoying for the un-addicted
gamer.177 At bottom, present pain and ultimate fate turn principally on the
innate advantages with which given participants enter.
A.

Reverse Screening

In one important sense, drug courts stand on somewhat worse footing
than trials by ordeal. Trials by ordeal are irrational practices (in that thick
skin bears no relationship with blameworthiness).178 But drug courts—at
least felony drug courts of the New York City breed—are not simply
arbitrary. Instead, the results are predictably regressive: capacity to cease
use is proportional to participants’ affluence, social support, systemically
favored race, and non-existent or weak addiction. In short, participants who
need help most (from the standpoint of distributive justice),179 and who are
least volitional and therefore least deserving of punishment (from the
standpoint of retributive justice),180 are the very participants for whom “trial

(1992) (noting that imprisoning offender based on failure to comply with treatment poses
problem that “the prisoner's punishment is being neither defined nor limited by the
culpability of his acts”); see also Hoffman, supra note 11, at 2088 (“drug court . . . requires us
to send people to prison not because they violated the law . . . but rather because they
resisted our enlightened treatment efforts.”).
177 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
178 Pilarczyk, supra note 173, at 106 (noting that “historians have traditionally derided the
ordeal as being fundamentally irrational”). As a contemporary put it: “[I]nnocence is too
closely connected with calluses.” Id. at 102; see also Colman, supra note 173, at 589 n.11
(“[S]ome medieval feet would obviously have a better chance than others to make it across.”).
179 See supra notes 95, __ and accompanying text.
180 Wallace, supra note 99, at 652 (“Addiction, in other words, should be thought of as
producing a condition of potentially diminished accountability.”); Morse, supra note 71, at 4,
6, 24, 45-47 (“[I]f prohibited activity does not meet the criteria for intentional action . . . the
harmdoer will be exculpated.”); Miller, supra note 1, at 1523-24 (“The retributivist would
argue that some kind of moral norm precludes punishing an involuntary act. . . . When . . .
the cravings are moderate or few mitigating circumstances are present . . . ingestion will be
more blameworthy.”); see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“Even one
day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common
cold.”); Bonnie at 410 (“[M]any judges probably share the moral intuition that addiction
should be an occasion for compassion and mitigation, even if it does not qualify as an excuse.
. . . Compulsion may diminish responsibility, but it does not erase it.”); Levy, supra note 71,
at 134; United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Skelly, J.,
dissenting) (noting that punishment requires culpability and culpability requires an act of
“free will”).
There is an argument from the standpoint of incapacitation or deterrence that greater
punishment is appropriate for recalcitrant addicts, who are more likely to continue violating
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by drug court” is most onerous and least successful. “Truly diseased addicts
end up going to prison, while those who respond well to treatment, and whose
use of drugs may thus have been purely voluntary, escape punishment.”181
In a rational world, the backward incentives of New York City’s drug
courts would function, literally, to weed out the genuine addicts that are the
purported foci of the drug-court model and to weed in for-profit volitional
drug dealers. The model is, therefore, an example of “reverse moral
screening,”182 which raises moral hazards similar to those described in
George Akerlof’s seminal Lemons article.183 Specifically, Akerlof explained
that a used-car market may be flooded with “lemons,” because buyers cannot
effectively screen for quality. Those prospective buyers who concurrently
drug (and other) laws. See Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S.
Sentencing Commission's Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1074 (2003) (“From a utilitarian perspective . . . an exceptional history of
drug abuse might serve as an aggravating factor . . . [a]s at least one indicator of an
offender's propensity to commit crimes.”). Indeed, it is this very claim that has led to the
harsh sentences that typify the war on drugs. But as this losing (or, at best, stalemated) war
has shown, longer sentences are not up to the task. See supra notes ___. In any event, drug
courts claim to be doing something quite different from subjecting recidivist addicts to stiffer
sentences. See, e.g., COMMISSION, supra note 42, at 5, 10-11 (arguing that drug court’s intent
is to target for treatment “core group” of addicted recidivist offenders whose crimes “stem
from their addiction”); see also supra notes ___.
Of course, there may be a separate argument (from the standpoint of incapacitation or
specific deterrence) that drug courts effectively work to provide longer sentences (and to
exercise greater consequent social control over) the kinds of recalcitrant addicts who are
more likely to continue violating drug (and other) laws. See Aaron J. Rappaport,
Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Troubling Silence About the
Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1074 (2003) (“From a utilitarian
perspective . . . an exceptional history of drug abuse might serve as an aggravating factor . . .
[a]s at least one indicator of an offender's propensity to commit crimes.”). Indeed, it is this
very claim that has led to the harsh sentences that typify the war on drugs. But as this
losing (or, at best, stalemated) war has shown, longer sentences are not up to the task. See
supra notes ___. In any event, drug courts claim to be doing something quite different from
subjecting recidivist addicts to stiffer sentences. See, e.g., COMMISSION, supra note 42, at 5,
10-11 (arguing that drug court’s intent is to target for treatment “core group” of addicted
recidivist offenders whose crimes “stem from their addiction”); see also supra notes ___.
181 Hoffman, supra note 11, at 2089; see also Miller, supra note 1, at 1533 (“There is a
difference between the ‘incipient, volitional’ addict and those who have ‘lost the power of selfcontrol.’ The incipient, moderately rational addict can respond to reason-affecting stimuli;
the out-of-control addict can no longer do so.” (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
680 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting)).
182 Hoffman, supra note 11, at 2089; see also Miller, supra note 1, at 1547 (discussing the
problem of drug-court “over- and under-inclusiveness.”).
183 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. ECON. 488-500 (1970); see generally Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew
Weiss, Sorting out the Differences Between Screening and Signaling Models, in PAPERS IN
COMMEMORATION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY SEMINAR AT OXFORD UNIVERSITY (Michael
Dempster, ed. (1989)); Michael A. Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QUART J. ECON. 561-72
(1973).
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might have high-quality used cars to sell tend to withdraw, thereby keeping
the good used cars out of the market and leaving only the clunkers.184
Analogously, as the Bronx and Staten Island data have revealed, drug-court
participants did worse on average than conventionally adjudicated
defendants, and drug-court failures did magnitudes worse.185 Rationally,
then, only un-addicted gamers—who knew they were non-compulsive and
could thereby volitionally refrain from drug use—should have chosen to
enter. The problem, of course, is that, ideally, we want drug treatment courts
to consist of defendants who require treatment and whose crimes are the
product of genuine dependencies, just as we want used-car markets to consist
of quality cars (or, at least, cars with only apparent defects).
A difference remains, however: unlike Akerlof’s high-quality sellers who
saw fit to withdraw, addicted drug offenders (who, as we have seen, are
irrational and akratic) do not.186 Instead, they make the mistake of opting in.
At bottom, then, a strange and troubling duality is at play in drug courts: the
courts present opportunities for strategic gaming to rational un-addicted
defendants; and, concurrently, they exploit the penchant of irrational
addicted defendants to seek risk, unduly prioritize the present, and overoptimistically rate their own capacities for success.187 Consequently, drug
courts draw in most all potential comers.188 Again, the Bronx data are telling.
In that county, only eight percent of prospective participants rejected drugcourt offers; the other ninety-two percent felt that they were better off with
the drug-court option than with trials or conventional pleas—even though, on
average, they most certainly were not.189 For the forty-eight percent who
failed, this was a costly error.190
Notably, most drug court literature has failed to capture the
individualized consequences of such backward screening. In study after
study, drug courts are celebrated for overall reductions in recidivism and
overall conservation of resources.191 Lost amid the positive generalities are
the profound impacts of termination on individual participants and an
Id.
See supra notes 79-80, tbl.1 and accompanying text.
186 See supra Part II.B.
187 Id.
188 Cf. Hepburn & Harvey, supra note 85, at 256 (“Legal coercion may be a strong
motivation to treatment, but it is apparent that many of those legally coerced to treatment
fail.”).
189 REMPEL, supra note 3, at ___.
190 See supra tbl.1.
191 See generally David B. Wilson, et al., A Systematic Review of Drug Court Effects on
Recidivism, 2 J. Experimental Criminology 459-87 (2006) (reviewing forty-one drug court
evaluations); BELENKO, supra note 6 (reviewing thirty-seven drug-court evaluations). Steven
Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT’L DRUG CT. INST. REV. 1-42
(1998).
184
185
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appropriate understanding of who these failing participants are most likely
to be. Proponents claim success as long as comprehensive benefits outweigh
total costs (notwithstanding common failure and its inordinately high prices).
Systemically, discrete treatment failure goes largely unnoticed; or rather, it
is just another negative checkmark on an on-going tally. But for the failing
participant it is disaster. Global appraisals, then, run the risk of missing the
trees for the forest. They ignore the regressive fact that fewer people—more
likely acute addicts and/or members of distressed communities—are sent
away for longer periods of time.192
B.

Blind Faith

A principal problem is that drug courts, like trials by ordeal, put great
stock in scientifically unfounded principles. There is no need to linger on the
methodological flaws of trials by ordeal. Drug courts are less obviously
problematic. But there is not much beyond blind faith to support the central
drug-court assumption that coerced treatment works just as well (or better)
than voluntary treatment—that external motivation effectively leads to
internal motivation.193 Significantly, the claim runs up against conventional
therapeutic wisdom and a host of studies that have shown voluntary
treatment to be superior to compulsory.194 And, intuitively, that seems right,

192 REMPEL, supra note 3, at xi, 40-41; O’KEEFE & REMPEL, supra note 22, at 40; see supra
notes ___.
193 See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, How Judges Can Use Behavioral Contracting, in JUDGING IN
THE A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winnick &
David B. Wexler, eds. 2003) (noting that, through process of “internalization,” participants
come to “choice” of treatment, even if initial choice was only to avoid prison); Miller, supra
note 1, at 1537 (describing argument that external motivation can lead to internal
motivation); Edwards at 309-10 (same). Thus, for example, in the New York City seemingly
important considerations like “lack of motivation/treatment readiness” are not disqualifying.
REMPEL, supra note 3, at 17.
194 Beckerman & Fontana, supra note 82, at 46 (finding no difference between compulsory
and voluntary programs and concluding that “[t]he involuntary client is highly resistant to
treatment.”); Hepburn & Harvey, supra note 85, at 273 (finding no difference in retention
and completion rates between two courts in same jurisdiction, where one had the power to
sentence failures to jail and the other did not); J. Sansone, Retention Patterns in a
Therapeutic Community for the Treatment of Drug Abuse, 15 INT’L J. OF ADDICTIONS 711-36
(1980) (finding no relationship between legal status and treatment retention); Stevens et al.,
supra note 38, at 274 (citing studies showing that “legal coercion has been shown to harm the
prospects of completing treatment”); Ainslie, supra note 85, at 112 (“Coercion undermines a
person’s will to do what we demand. It replaces the incentive for the person to maintain his
credibility to himself with external incentives, thus reducing the motivational basis of his
will.”); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1475 n.153 (arguing that drug courts reject conventional
therapeutic view that effective depends on the defendant entering voluntarily); Hoffman,
supra note 11, at 2089 (arguing that state-coerced treatment is ineffective); see generally
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 17 (1974) (“In psychological treatment of
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because coerced participants, at least when they have genuine dependencies,
“are less likely to believe they need treatment, are less ready for treatment,
and are less willing to actively participate in their treatment.”195 Indeed, the
inadequacy of external stimuli is the very reason that many addicts have
hung onto destructive habits for so long—in spite of the numerous everyday
good reasons they may have had to quit.196
Why do drug court proponents put such great faith in the false—or at
least unfounded197—contrary premise that internal motivation prompts
external motivation? They do so because they must: it is a prerequisite belief,
needed to get beyond the bottom-line fact that participants enter drug
courts—not because they wish to be there or are ready for treatment—but
because they got caught.198 Drug court proponents construct a story that
seemingly justifies punitive response: the terminated addict is said to deserve
greater punishment because he has shown “consistent disregard for the
court’s authority.”199 Drug court judges, thereafter, can comfortably sentence
treatment failures to long alternative sentences, under the ruse that “it must
be the defendant’s ‘fault’”—that the failing defendant “must be one of those
‘volunteer’ addicts.”200

abnormal behavior it is widely agreed that conventional psychotherapy . . . must be
voluntarily entered into by the patient if it is to be effective.”).
195 Hepburn & Harvey, supra note 85, at 256.
196 Supra Part I.B. Moreover, there is a distinct danger to telling individuals they are
diseased and then pushing cure at the barrel of a gun: the most mentally and physically
fragile may come to feel helpless and hopeless. PEELE, supra note 41, at 1 (“When individuals
become subject to coercive judicial or treatment systems, they are likely to be especially
confused, self-doubting, and vulnerable.”); cf. Wild, et al., supra note 43, at 42 (describing
“self-fulfilling prophecies that translate into lower levels of interest in behavior change”).
197 Miller, supra note 1, at 1558 (noting “paucity of much-needed empirical research on the
relationship between coercion and therapy”); Stevens, et al., supra note 38, at 276 “[P]olicy
and practical decisions are being made in the absence of conclusive evidence on which to base
them.”); Maxwell at 558 (“[T]he efficacy of these threats in forcing offenders to stay in
treatment has not been systematically examined or empirically substantiated.”).
198 PEELE, supra note 41, at 9 (explaining that participants are compelled by
“compromising context” to enter coerced treatment).
199 PORTER, supra note 30, at 12 (describing Bronx district attorney’s position on why
atypically high alternative sentences are appropriate).
200 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1476 (“We compassionate judges can then sentence that
defendant to prison, smug with the knowledge that our experts, by the simple device of
offering treatment a certain arbitrary number of times, can separate the diseased from the
criminal.”); cf. Miller, supra note 1, at 1497 n.101 (quoting drug court judge that he would
“push them, shove them, box them by using the threat of incarceration to get them to start
down the path”); NOLAN, supra note 7, at 196.

WORKING DRAFT – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR CITATION

41

Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008)

C.

Incoherence

Even if drug court proponents are somehow right that external coercion
is superior to internal motivation, the claim is incoherent with first-order
drug-court principles. Drug courts are supposed to provide diversion not only
on utilitarian cost-saving grounds, but also on the retributive-justice ground
that addicts possess diminished responsibility for somewhat compulsive
conduct.201 In this vein, the courts are meant to stake out the elusive middle
ground between the extreme views of addict as automaton and addict as
rational actor—to call a truce in “the tired stalemate between disease and
utility models of addiction.”202
But in the effort to chart the missing center, the courts take a
theoretically disjointed approach: they adopt a medical tact when treating the
participating “patient,” but a penal tact when disposing of treatment failures.
They view the addict as only partially responsible (and, rhetorically, perhaps
not even that) when valuing the retributive worth of his crime, but wholly
rational when it comes to his success or failure at responding to carrots and
sticks. On the one hand, drug court defendants are told that they have a
disease that drives them to behave in a certain way, but, on the other, that
they are wholly responsible when they fail to recover. Drug courts claim to
understand that relapse is an inevitable step in recovery from the affliction of
addiction.203 But such tolerance runs only up to the point of termination.
Drug court is ultimately an all-or-nothing proposition: graduation or failure;
liberty or prison.204 And, just like the early-medieval accused, who was made

See supra notes ___.
Ainslie, supra note 85, at 112; see also Wallace, supra note 99, at 621, 654 (calling the
polar views “cartoonish”); Morse, supra note 71, at 22 (“There is no reason to believe that our
thinking about addiction must be polar, that is only brain disease or only intentional
conduct, that it is best treated only medically or psychologically or only by criminalization.
Addiction can be both brain disease and moral weakness, both a proper subject for treatment
and for moral judgment.”); Hoffman, supra note7, at 1472 (noting that “the disease model of
addiction [i]s an enlightened reaction to what historically has been the only other
alternative: the view that all drug use is simple willful conduct”); see also Morse, supra note
71, at 6 (arguing that monolithic perceptions of addiction are “alluring because they imply
that there are technical, clean solutions”).
203 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, DRUG COURT STANDARDS
COMMITTEE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS, COMPONENT #6 (1997)
(discussing relapse as part of road to recovery); REMPEL, supra note 3, at xiv (“Relapse and
noncompliance are common, even among those who ultimately succeed. . . . This highlights
the value of drug courts according multiple chances to participants experiencing early
problems.”); Miller, supra note 1, at1485 (discussing “inevitability of relapse”).
204 Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1475 (“[T]he treatment community teaches us that recovery is
a continuing process of failures and successes. Yet, to appease the law enforcement
community, drug courts typically impose an arbitrary number . . . of excusable failures before
the drug defendant is treated like any other criminal defendant and sentenced accordingly.”).
201
202
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to pay the price for the “offense” of allowing himself to be burned by hot iron,
the drug-court failure is punished not for the crime he has committed but for
the treatment he has resisted—whether or not he had the clarity of mind or
strength of will to do better.205
An example of this counter-logical reasoning and theoretical incoherence
comes from the New York State Commission that endorsed statewide
expansion of drug courts.206 In one telling passage, the Commission offered a
dubious syllogism of conflicting claims, made to seem constant.207
Specifically, the Commission initially accepted the disease premise: that “[the
addict] once addicted, ordinarily cannot overcome his addiction simply by
‘choosing’ to become drug-free.”208 And, therefore, the compulsive addict
cannot be expected to respond appropriately to external demands against use;
rather “physical, psychological, social, economic and legal harms . . . are
tolerated and accepted by the addict.”209 But then the Commission offered a
bizarre conclusion:
What this points to is the need for external influence and coercion: if an
addict is willing to tolerate all these self-inflicted harms, it is unreasonable
to believe that he or she will—without outside pressure—develop the
necessary motivation to overcome his or his addiction. . . . [E]xternal
sanction and rewards . . . promote consequential thinking and personal
responsibility. . . . [I]t is the coercive leverage provided by the threat of
incarceration and other sanctions that is key.210

In what way are these self-inflicted harms—such as, arrest, jail, prison,
disintegration of social ties, unemployment, homelessness, and/or declining
health—not external? This, then, is the drug court philosophy (such as it is)
in a nutshell: The addict is incapable of acting rationally (though he may or
may not rationally know what he should do). Therefore, we must give him,
what? More reason to start following reason.211
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1514 (“[W]e sentence defendants to prison . . . for their failed
treatment rather than for their unlawful drug use.”); see also infra Part II.C.
206 COMMISSION, supra note 42.
207 Id. at 16.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Some have taken this incoherence one step further. In the Brooklyn Treatment Court,
for example, a project director issued a memorandum to practitioners, indicating that
“defendants who decline treatment will not receive the typical or ‘usual’ plea offers.” Boldt,
supra note 6, at 1258 n.3. Thus, the message is that addicts should be punished for denial of
addiction standing alone. Worse still, the memo further provided that “the defendant retains
the option, up until the point of hearing and trial, to accept treatment,” but “the longer the
defendant waits to opt for treatment, the greater the period of incarceration should the
defendant fail to comply with the Court’s treatment mandate.” Id. In Brooklyn Treatment
205
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At bottom, then, the theoretical gap in the drug-court model is less
pertinent than the lack of a gap between drug courts and conventional
justice. The commonly invoked the mantra is that the drug-court model is an
“innovative form of justice.”212 But, in operation, the courts share with
conventional justice the belief that threats of strong punishment will deter
future action. And drug courts keep conventional justice—often in its most
powerful forms—always in the background and close at hand. Drug courts,
then, are not divorced from conventional justice; they are grafted indelibly
onto it. Calling drug courts innovative justice is a bit like painting a vibrant
mural on a drab brick wall, doubling the wall’s thickness for good measure,
and then declaring the wall no more. Just like that wall, punitive drug
statutes remain firmly in place.213
Drug courts seize on the mantra that “[w]hat we were doing before . . .
wasn’t working.”214 But, then—at least for the participants they most want to
cure—they often do more of the same (and then some).
V.

BETTER MEDICINE?

At least from the standpoints of retributive and distributive justice, it is
counterintuitive and incoherent to provide inordinately harsh punishments to
addicts, simply because they have (predictably) accepted bewitching
invitations to treatment and have (predictably) failed to live up to their own
and our own false expectations of what they could achieve once there.215
Nevertheless, we may not wish to wholly abandon drug courts. If the courts
really do (as it appears) reduce overall recidivism and preserve overall
criminal-justice resources, then these are gains that we should want to
keep—notwithstanding the courts’ several shortcomings.216 Put differently,
Court, then, the act of even considering ones amenability to treatment has come to be a
punishable offense.
212 Miller, supra note 1, at 1503 n.137 (citing sources that invoke phrase).
213 Miller, supra note 1, at 1481 (“Instead of challenging the drug laws, these courts operate
within the current legislative framework.”); see also infra note 232 and accompanying text.
214 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 44, 106.
215 Cf. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 20, at 1163 (arguing that policy should not be
constructed around false proposition that “almost all people, almost all of the time, make
choices that are in their best interest or at least are better . . . than the choices that would be
made by third parties”).
216 See, e.g., David B. Wilson, et al., A Systematic Review of Drug Court Effects on
Recidivism, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 459-87 (2006) (reviewing forty-one drug court
evaluations and finding mean reduction in recidivism of 14%); Beckerman & Fontana, supra
note 82, at 58 (describing “limited benefits for some criminal offenders.”); REMPEL, supra note
3, at x, xii, 273-82; Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT’L
DRUG CT. INST. REV. 17-18 (1998) (“Drug courts have been more successful than other forms
of community supervision in closely supervising drug offenders in the community . . . [and]
drug courts reduce recidivism for participants after they leave the program.”).
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because the conventional drug war is unsustainable and unwise, any halfway
defensible alternative might be welcome for that reason alone.217 At a
minimum, however, drug courts should ensure that termination sentences
track customary plea prices, and they should strive to institute more effective
screening mechanisms.218 However, any such minimal proposal (that
operates within the prevailing drug-court paradigm) would do little,
ultimately, to address the courts’ root problems, but instead, would merely
meliorate the courts’ most problematic symptoms.
I have in mind a somewhat stronger proposal that would uncouple drug
courts entirely from conventional justice. My rough-and-ready idea builds off
of a commonly observed addiction phenomenon, known as “aging out,”
whereby the strength of drug dependency fades overtime.219 Specifically, as
addicts mature toward middle age, they grow more amenable to treatment
and, likewise, to consequential thought and action.220 A more effective and
See Zimring, supra note 176, at 815-18 (arguing that normative objections to drug court
can be measured only comparatively with traditional draconian sentences); see also supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
218 Zimring, supra note 176, at 818 (arguing that drug courts should not provide atypical
sentences unless participant is convicted of new charges). Significantly, such a proposal
would not undermine therapeutic effectiveness. For those participants who were ready for
external motivation, already-lengthy conventional felony sentences should provide incentive
enough to comply with treatment. After all, a number of observers have indicated that longer
alternative sentences do not impact on treatment success. TRONE, supra note 21, at 11
(quoting general counsel of national treatment provider: “We work with programs where
there’s an additional penalty if you fail and programs in which participants get the same
punishment if they fail as if they never entered the program. I don’t think I could say with
any degree of confidence that severity alone makes a difference in the outcome.”); Denise C.
Gottfredson, et al., How Drug Courts Work: An Analysis of Mediators, 44 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 3, 26 (2007) (finding that enhanced alternative sentences “do not ultimately
influence crime or drug use”); cf. Jolls et al., supra note 113, at 46 (“Short punishments will .
. . have much more effect than long punishments as a result of the ‘priority of the present’;
adding years onto a sentence will produce little additional deterrence.”). More importantly,
for those participants who were not yet ready—for the irrational and akratic acute addicts
who had not yet come to possess internal motivation (but who erroneously believed they
could find it in drug courts)—treatment would provide no gateway to unwarranted atypical
punishment.
Notably, as long as atypically high termination sentences remain in place, the failure of
drug courts to adequately screen for genuine addiction turns out to be somewhat fortuitous:
it limits the distributive and retributive effects of the contraindication problem, because
acute addicts are (at least to some degree) funneled toward conventional justice where they
are likelier to do better. However, once the problem of atypical termination sentences is
rectified, the problem of inadequate screening becomes more pressing.
219 See Rempel & Destafano, supra note 83, at 91 (“[P]ersons grow tired of their addicted
lifestyle . . . criminal behavior peaks in late adolescence and gradually declines thereafter.”);
PEELE, supra note 74, at 125 (describing aging out process as “a gradual ripening into
remission”); supra note 85 and accompanying text.
220 George Ainslie, A Research-Based Theory of Addictive Motivation, 19 LAW & PHIL. 90
(2000) (“[O]lder subjects discount the future less steeply than younger ones.”).
217
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less-problematic drug-court approach might be a non-coercive model that the
addict could opt into once he had started the age-out process—at the stage of
his life when he had begun to internalize a commitment to therapeutic
intervention, but when he still required some help to get and keep clean.221
Such an “opt-in” model would function as a voluntary resource, not as a
coercive regime. Choices would remain open at the points of entry and exit,
“not blocked or fenced off.”222 In this way, the model would subscribe to
something like a “libertarian paternal” philosophy; it would provide
“nudges”—but not shoves—down therapeutically beneficial paths.223
What types of external motivation (or “nudges”) could such an “opt-in”
model provide? There are myriad possibilities. For example, one potential
carrot could be the promise of a court order that would expunge the
graduate’s past record of drug and drug-related convictions. Such an “opt-in”
model would provide a more effective tool for offender reintegration, because
it could reach more widely and deeply than the conventional model.224 It
could be made available to a broader population of ex-offenders—including
long-time drug offenders with significant records (who are more likely to be
addicts but who are also more likely to be barred from traditional drug
courts).225 And it would have the power to expunge multiple non-violent
convictions of various types (as long as graduates could show that the
convictions were products of past addiction).226 Most importantly, the model

Cf. NOLAN, supra note 7, at 140 (“The goal of drug court is to bring the defendant to
internalize an understanding of his substance-abuse problem.”); see also Miller, supra note 1,
at 1497, 1543 (“The goal . . . is to encourage the offender to realize that the program is
designed for his or his own benefit.”).
222 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 20, at 1162.
223 Id. at 1162, 1192 (“[L]ibertarian paternalists urge that people should be ‘free to choose.’
. . . [W]e argue for self-conscious efforts, by public and private institutions, to steer people’s
choices in directions that will improve the choosers’ own welfare.”); see also Thaler &
Sunstein at 175 (“If no coercion is involved, we think that some types of paternalism should
be acceptable to even the most ardent libertarian. We call such actions libertarian
paternalism.” (emphasis in original)); Corrado, supra note 110, at 35 “[I]f the behavioral
economist is right we might arrange choices so that people can get what they want for the
long run without our making the choice for them. . . . [I]t might be possible to arrange things
so that the addict who wanted to quit could find a way to do it.” (emphasis added)).
224 Drug courts have been faulted for adopting an “organizational rhetoric” of reintegration
but failing to fulfill that promise. Terrance D. Miethe, Hong Lu & Erin Reese, Reintegrative
Shaming and Recidivism Risks in Drug Court: Explanations for Some Unexpected Findings,
46 Crime & Delinquency 522, 536 (2000) (noting that drug courts produce a shaming effect
that may serve a reintegrative purpose for some but may cause a “deviance-amplification
effect” for others).
225 Indeed, the courts could also be a treatment resource for non-offenders as well, although
(under at least my proposed model) they would get no external reward for graduation.
226 It would probably be easiest for the ex-offender to demonstrate a link between incomegenerating crimes and drugs. See Brownberger at 67-68 (citing studies); REMPEL, supra note
3, at 280 (“[A] substance abuse addiction can cause non-drug-related crime.”).
221
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would serve to remove the corollary consequences of conviction and would
provide treatment and social services precisely when ex-offenders were most
ready to start anew.227
Finally, such an “opt-in” drug-court model would screen more effectively
for addiction. The addicted ex-offender would elect to enter from a baseline of
liberty. He would choose to place himself in treatment, because the aggregate
value of a cleaner record and a cure would outweigh the opportunity costs of
life under drug-court constraint. The voluntary decision to opt in would,
thereby, signal genuine therapeutic need. Conversely, the un-addicted exoffender would lack adequate external incentive to game entry into the court.
He would derive no value from cure, and the prospect of a lighter sentence
alone would be insufficient to justify the costs of undergoing rigorous and
long-term unneeded treatment.
Of course, such an innovative approach might create fresh problems. For
example, it might (or might not) prove to be an inefficient and unwarranted
expenditure of resources for recalcitrant offenders.228 And it would, of course,
provide only an indirect alternative to incarceration.229 But the problems of
the “opt-in” model might well be smaller than the problems at present. And,
at a minimum, the model would have the substantial advantage of operating
free of conventional justice and atypical termination sentences. In any event,
I offer this (loosely formulated) proposal, not as an absolute fix, but as a kind
of thought experiment intended to highlight the fact that the drug-court
model can—and probably should—be reconsidered in dynamic ways.230
CONCLUSION
227 Cf. REMPEL, supra note 3, at xiv (“Beyond substance abuse recovery, drug courts seek to
promote further achievements and lifestyle changes in the areas of employment, education,
vocational training, housing, and family reunification.”).
228 Conversely, the courts might prove more effective, because the formerly recalcitrant
addict would be internally motivated—and therefore readier—to succeed. Indeed, this is the
very reason that drug-court studies have consistently shown higher graduation rates for
older offenders who have begun to age out of their habits. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text. That aside, the proposal would certainly be less wasteful than the
current model that provides unneeded treatment to gamers and ineffective treatment to
acute addicts—groups that typically are only in treatment because they want to avoid
incarceration.
229 Specifically, the model might succeed in keeping addicts from recidivating and
returning to prison, but they would leave unaffected the potentially significant jail or prison
sentences that the addicted ex-offenders already had served. Conversely, this is a tradeoff we
should be willing to make, because the proposal would alleviate the contraindication and
screening problems and would wholly eliminate the potential for atypical termination
sentences.
230 Cf. Stevens, et al., supra note 38, at 272 (explaining that “treatment may be applied at
any stage of the criminal justice system”). Indeed, one of the widely-cited benefits of drug
courts is their amenability to experimentation. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 46, at 841-52; supra
note 46, __ and accompanying text. And, we should be open to such innovation—as long as
the power of the carceral state does not play a role when our experiments fail.
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In the enthusiasm to find some kind (any kind) of viable option to the
inequities and inefficiencies that typify conventional drug justice, there is an
understandable tendency to see in drug courts something more than what
they actually are. The problem with drug courts, then, is not that they have
failed to serve certain good purposes. They may have, or they may not have.
The problem with drug courts is the false promise ascribed to them—that
they can be “all things to all people.”231 In reality, they are able to realize
such tall promise only when the right kinds of participants succeed. When
that happens, resources are preserved, recidivism is reduced, and
rehabilitated drug offenders are restored to their communities. Everyone
comes out a winner. But when participants fail, there are unanticipated
downsides—like far longer sentences for the very defendants who historically
have faced the greatest rates and lengths of imprisonment under the
traditional war on drugs (and who already occupy the bottom rungs of
society).
Ultimately, drug courts are no more than politically feasible but
imperfect second-order mechanisms that circumvent undesirable sentencing
statutes some of the time for some of the defendants. They are mechanisms
that operate at all times within—and that may even serve to prop up—the
prevailing system.232 Perhaps, the political reality is that we can do no better.
However, it does not translate from that reality that there is no better. The
first-best solution remains always the one we are least ready to engage: to
rethink the mandatory sentencing laws that undergird our failed drug
policies.

Miller, supra note 1, at 1503.
See Miller, supra note 1, at 1481; COMMISSION, supra note 42 (Stanley S. Arkin,
concurring and dissenting from commission’s report; and arguing that the commission’s
report endorsing statewide expansion of drug courts “is neither bold nor visionary regarding
the most fundamental issue facing the State courts and criminal justice system with respect
to drug abuse and drug-related offenses—the enormous expense, dubious morality and
questionable efficacy of the draconian mandatory sentencing statutes often referred to as the
‘Rockefeller drug laws.’”); see also supra note 45, __ and accompanying text. In other
contexts, scholars have raised a similar objection against supposed reforms that are “cheap
for society,” but, in fact, “encourage[] us to look away from real social problems.” Levy, supra
note 71, at 141 (discussing ineffective drug reforms); see also Louis Michael Seidman,
Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 207 (1995) (arguing that
procedural protections are wholly ineffective, and, instead, that “constitutional protections
intended to make prosecution more difficult instead serve to make the prosecutor’s job
easier”); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).
231
232
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